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R. Wilson Freyermuth*
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, virtually all mortgages contain acceleration clauses
permitting the mortgagee to accelerate the mortgage indebted-
ness upon default by the mortgagor as defined in the mortgage
loan documentation. Section 8.1 of the new Restatement (Third)
of Property: Mortgages [hereinafter Mortgages Restatement]'
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1. Section 8.1 provides:
(a) An acceleration provision is a term in a mortgage, or in the obligation
it secures, that empowers the mortgagee upon default by the mortgagor to
declare the full mortgage obligation immediately due and payable. An
acceleration becomes effective on the date specified in a written notice by the
mortgagee to the mortgagor delivered after default.
(b) Prior to the date an acceleration becomes effective, the mortgagor may
cure the default and reinstate the mortgage obligation by paying or tendering
to the mortgagee the amount that is then owing on the mortgage obligation
or performing any other duty the mortgagor is obligated to perform under the
terms of the mortgage documents.
(c) After an acceleration has taken place and subject to Subsection (d), a
mortgagor may prevent foreclosure only by paying or tendering to the
mortgagee the full accelerated mortgage obligation.
(d) A mortgagor may defeat acceleration and reinstate the mortgage
obligation by paying or tendering to the mortgagee the amount due and owing
at the time of tender in the absence of acceleration and by performing any
other duty in default the mortgagor is obligated to perform in the absence of
acceleration if:
(1) such an action is authorized by statute or the terms of the
mortgage documents; or
(2) the mortgagee has waived its right to accelerate; or
(3) the mortgagee has engaged in fraud, bad faith, or other conduct
making acceleration unconscionable.
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endorses the view that these mortgage acceleration provisions
are generally enforceable after default in accordance with their
terms.2 Following default and acceleration, the mortgagor may
prevent foreclosure only by redeeming the property from the
mortgage debt, i.e., "only by paying or tendering to the mort-
gagee the full accelerated mortgage obligation."' Section
8.1(d)(3), however, places certain constraints upon the mort-
gagee's right to accelerate, permitting the mortgagor to reinstate
(after curing any existing defaults) if "the mortgagee has en-
gaged in fraud, bad faith, or other conduct making acceleration
unconscionable."4 This standard has a significant judicial pedi-
gree in mortgage law decisions, but its use of the elusive term
"bad faith"-a term often understood in the context of its more
honorable twin, "good faith"-creates the potential for uncer-
tainty in the evaluation of disputes over the enforcement of ac-
celeration provisions.
The rhetoric of good faith has played a significant role in
judicial opinions addressing challenges to creditor decisions to
exercise acceleration clauses following the occurrence of a de-
fault by the borrower. Most of these challenges involve a claim
by the borrower either that the lender's security or prospects for
repayment are not threatened (i.e., that the default poses no
actual harm to the lender meriting acceleration of the debt) or
that the lender's decision is pretextual or comes as an unfair
surprise. For example, consider the following hypothetical:
Randolph runs a small plumbing supply business, financed via a
$750,000 revolving line of credit (bearing an interest rate of
10%) from Local Bank. Local Bank holds a perfected security
interest in all of Randolph's inventory, accounts, and intangibles
as well as a recorded mortgage upon Randolph's business pre-
mises. Under the terms of the loan documents, Randolph must
provide audited financial statements to Local Bank each year by
January 14. Under the terms of the loan documents, failure by
Randolph to perform any obligation (whether monetary or non-
monetary) constitutes a default and entitles Local Bank to de-
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 8.1 (1997) [hereinafter MORTGAGES
RESTATEMENT].
2. See id. § 8.1 cmt. a.
3. Id. § 8.1(c).
4. Id. § 8.1(d)(3).
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mand immediate payment of the entire outstanding balance of
the line of credit.
Now consider the following scenarios, each involving a varia-
tion on the foregoing hypothetical.
Example One (Borrower Insolvency). As of January 15, 1998
(one day late), Randolph has not provided the audited financial
statements. Citing Randolph's failure to provide the financial
statements on a timely basis, Local Bank demands immediate
repayment of the entire credit line. Had Randolph provided the
financial statements, they would have shown him to be insol-
vent.
Example Two (Bank's Mistaken Perception of Insecurity). On
January 20, 1998 (six days late), Randolph provides Local Bank
with audited financial statements. The statements demonstrate
that Randolph has a net worth exceeding the outstanding bal-
ance of the credit line, and operating cash flows that are more
than sufficient to cover monthly amortization of that outstand-
ing balance. Furthermore, the financial statements indicate that
the value of Local Bank's collateral exceeds $1 million. Never-
theless, Smith (the Local Bank loan officer responsible for
Randolph's loan) is concerned by rumors that Home Depot will
open a new superstore in the area. Smith believes that a new
Home Depot would erode Randolph's customer base and render
his operations unprofitable. In reality, however, Home Depot
has decided not to open a new store in the area; the rumors are
the wishful thinking of a local real estate developer. As a conse-
quence of Smith's concerns, Local Bank demands immediate
repayment of the entire credit line, citing Randolph's failure to
provide the financial statements in a timely fashion as required
by the loan agreement.
Example Three (Bank Seeks Increased Interest Rate). On
January 20, 1998 (six days late), Randolph provides the audited
financial statements. The statements demonstrate that
Randolph has a net worth exceeding the outstanding balance of
the credit line, and operating cash flows that are more than
sufficient to cover monthly amortization of that outstanding
balance. Furthermore, the financial statements indicate that the
value of Local Bank's collateral exceeds $1 million. Neverthe-
less, Smith (the Local Bank loan officer responsible for
Randolph's loan) informs Randolph that Local Bank will de-
mand immediate repayment of the entire credit line, based upon
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Randolph's failure to provide the financial statements in a
timely fashion, unless Randolph agrees to increase the contract
interest rate to 12.5%. When Randolph refuses, Local Bank de-
mands immediate repayment of the outstanding balance of the
credit line, citing Randolph's failure to provide the financial
statements in a timely fashion as required by the loan agree-
ment.
Example Four (Bank Makes Change in Lending Policy). In
December 1997, Local Bank is acquired by industry giant
MEGABank, which retains Local Bank's personnel in their ex-
isting positions. MEGABank executives issue a policy directive
informing Smith (the loan officer responsible for Randolph's
loan) and other former Local Bank personnel that MEGABank
policy strongly discourages commercial loans of less than $1
million. Further, the policy directive urges that bank personnel
should exercise "all means necessary to call existing loans"
smaller than that threshold, and that their success in doing so
would be factored into their performance evaluations for pur-
poses of salary, bonus, and promotion decisions. On January 20,
1998 (six days late), Randolph provides the audited financial
statements. The statements demonstrate that Randolph has a
net worth exceeding the outstanding balance of the credit line,
and operating cash flows that are more than sufficient to cover
monthly amortization of that outstanding balance. Furthermore,
the financial statements indicate that the value of Local Bank's
collateral exceeds $1 million. Citing Randolph's failure to pro-
vide the financial statements in a timely fashion, MEGABank
demands immediate repayment of the outstanding balance of
the credit line.
Example Five (The Loan Officer's Animus). On January 20,
1998 (six days late), Randolph provides the audited financial
statements. The statements demonstrate that Randolph has a
net worth exceeding the outstanding balance of the credit line,
and operating cash flows that are more than sufficient to cover
monthly amortization of that outstanding balance. Furthermore,
the financial statements indicate that the value of Local Bank's
collateral exceeds $1 million. On behalf of Local Bank, Smith
(the Local Bank loan officer responsible for Randolph's loan)
demands immediate repayment of the outstanding balance of
the credit line, citing Randolph's failure to provide the financial
statements in a timely fashion as required by the loan agree-
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ment. In reality, Smith's decision was motivated by personal
animus resulting from a decision in late 1997 by Randolph's son
(who was married to Smith's daughter, Jane) to leave Jane and
their children for a younger woman.
If Randolph challenges the ability of the Bank to call in his
credit line, in which examples (if any) should the court sustain
his challenge? Section 8.1 suggests that the Bank's acceleration
provision is generally enforceable, and in each example
Randolph has violated a term of the loan agreement, thereby
apparently triggering the Bank's reserved contractual right to
demand full and immediate repayment of the credit line. But
would the Bank's decision in any of the examples constitute "bad
faith" within the meaning of section 8.1(d)(3), thereby defeating
the Bank's reserved contractual right?
Example One, of course, presents no analytical problem. Not
only does Randolph's failure to provide the financial statements
violate a term of the loan agreement, but Randolph's insolvency
places the Bank's decision to call the loan and enforce its reme-
dies beyond reasonable challenge. The Bank's decision would
comply with its duty of good faith performance under any con-
ception of that duty. The other four examples, however, present
the possibility of significant analytical disagreement because the
Bank's prospects for repayment do not appear to be threatened
and the Bank's secured position is solid. In Example Two, the
Bank officer honestly believes that the Bank's prospects for re-
payment are threatened, but his belief appears to be mistaken
and perhaps even negligent. If so, is the Bank's decision made in
"bad faith"? In Examples Three and Four the Bank uses the
violation as a basis for acting to protect its general economic
interests-to obtain a higher interest rate (in Example Three) or
to extract itself from the relationship based upon a change in
bank policy (in Example Four). Are these decisions bad faith
pretextual surprises or foreseeable good faith exercises of pru-
dent business judgment? In Example Five, the Bank's decision
is motivated not by any business concerns, but by the Bank offi-
cer's personal animus toward Randolph. Is this decision a bad
faith pretextual surprise, or a foreseeable decision authorized by
an arms-length bargain?
This Article explores the extent to which courts have strug-
gled to give meaning to "good faith" as a constraint upon a credi-
tor's enforcement of its contractual remedies. Although the
HeinOnline  -- 1998 BYU L. Rev. 1039 1998
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Mortgages Restatement seeks to introduce certainty and predict-
ability into mortgage law by advocating the free enforcement of
acceleration clauses, its use of the elusive "bad faith" standard
in section 8.1(d)(3) will compromise its ability to achieve that
certainty and predictability. In Part II the Article evaluates
section 8.1 and its stated objective of fostering certainty and
predictability in the enforcement of mortgage remedies.5 As Part
II explains, the desire for efficiency has caused some to define
the term "good faith" by reference to freedom-of-contract rheto-
ric; under this view, a creditor's decision to accelerate is in "good
faith" if (as in the sample hypotheticals) the borrower has
breached an objective term of the mortgage and the mortgage
expressly reserved the right to accelerate upon that breach.6
As described in Part III, however, this freedom-of-contract
view is not consistent with the duty of good faith performance
and enforcement as that duty has evolved through its incorpora-
tion into the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Uniform
Commercial Code. Instead, as Part III explains, the evolving
duty of good faith compels a more searching inquiry-one that
focuses not only upon whether the creditor honestly believes
that the contract authorizes its action, but also upon whether
the creditor's action under the circumstances comports with the
reasonable, yet unexpressed, expectations of the parties at the
time they entered into their bargain.'
Part IV explores the impact of the rhetoric of good faith on
judicial decisions involving challenges to creditor acceleration
decisions. Part IV focuses particularly on the tendency of some
courts to use "impairment of security"-sometimes improp-
erly-as a means to inform the parties' expectations about the
lender's power to accelerate the maturity of a debt.' In Part V
the article contrasts the enforcement of acceleration provisions
with the enforcement of land use restrictions in the law of servi-
tudes, in which courts have struggled with questions about the
enforceability of servitudes in the absence of harm.9 Part V dis-
cusses the resolution of this issue in the proposed Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes, which adopts a "rationality"
5. See infra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 29-93 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 94-153 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 154-84 and accompanying text.
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standard for the enforcement of land use restrictions." Part VI
the Article compares the "rationality" and "bad faith" standards
and offers some concluding observations, both about the resolu-
tion of the hypotheticals introduced above and the possible bene-
fits that may flow from the uncertainty occasioned by section
8.1's "bad faith" standard."
II. SECTION 8.1 AND EFFICIENCY IN MORTGAGE REMEDIES
Section 8.1 specifically governs acceleration decisions pursu-
ant to breaches of "objective" default provisions (e.g., failure to
pay installments in a timely fashion, failure to pay taxes, failure
to provide insurance), the violation of which can be demon-
strated by reference to objectively determinable facts. In con-
trast, a creditor sometimes may exercise the power to accelerate
pursuant to a "subjective" default provision (e.g., acceleration
based upon the mortgagee's decision to "deem itself insecure").
With regard to this latter group of acceleration decisions, the
standard for enforcement is relatively clear; both mortgage law
and the Uniform Commercial Code provide that a creditor may
not accelerate pursuant to an insecurity clause unless the credi-
tor honestly believes that its security or prospect of repayment is
actually threatened.'
One might argue that all acceleration decisions should be
governed by that same standard, regardless of the type of de-
fault involved. After all, the mortgage transaction (at its core)
serves to provide security for the repayment or performance of
the borrower's mortgage obligation. 3 In this regard, both "objec-
tive" and "subjective" default provisions are motivated by the
10. See infra notes 185-94 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 195-210 and accompanying text.
12. See Jackson v. State Bank, 488 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Iowa 1992) (stating that a
mortgagee cannot refuse to advance funds based upon insecurity clause in mortgage
note unless mortgagee in good faith believes its security or prospect of repayment is
impaired); MORTGAGES RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 8.1 reporters' note ("Where a
mortgage note actually contains [an insecurity clause], the good-faith requirement is
applicable."); U.C.C. § 1-208 (1995) ('A term providing that one party or his successor
in interest may accelerate payment or performance . . . 'at will' or 'vhen he deems
himself insecure' or in words of similar import shall be construed to mean that he shall
have power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or
performance is impaired.").
13. See MORTGAGES RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 1.1 cmt. ("The function of a
mortgage is to employ an interest in real estate as security for the performance of some
obligation.").
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mortgagee's desire to protect itself against conditions that could
threaten the mortgagee's security or its prospects for repayment.
As a result, one might articulate the view that a breach of an
objective default provision should not justify acceleration by the
mortgagee where that breach does not threaten the mortgagee's
security or its prospects for repayment, especially if the default
is nonmonetary in nature.
At first glance, section 8.1 of the Mortgages Restatement
rejects this view. The comments to section 8.1 distinguish the
violation of an objective default covenant from a subjective de-
fault (such as the commission of common law waste or the mort-
gagee's exercise of an insecurity clause) and suggest that the
mortgagee need not demonstrate impairment of the mortgagee's
security in order to justify acceleration following an objective
default:
The mortgagee's acceleration based on the mortgagor's
commission of common-law waste is permissible only when the
waste impairs the mortgagee's security .... On the other
hand, where the mortgagee's acceleration stems from the mort-
gagor's violation of specific covenants, impairment of security
need not be shown. Thus, for example, if the mortgage requires
the mortgagor to care for an improvement in a certain manner,
to insure the premises, or to pay real estate taxes, defaults on
these covenants are the proper basis for acceleration even
though they also constitute waste... and do not impair [the
mortgagee's] security.14
Furthermore, section 8.1 makes no distinctions between mone-
tary objective defaults and nonmonetary objective defaults. As
the comments suggest, "acceleration is not only permitted for
failure to pay the mortgage debt promptly, but also for defaults
in mortgage covenants to pay taxes, to maintain insurance, to
keep buildings intact, to maintain an adequate financial condi-
tion, to avoid the commission of waste, and the like." 5 These
comments appear to embrace a strong "freedom-of-contract"
view that accelerations based upon objective defaults should be
judged in accordance with the terms of the contract and the ob-
14. Id. § 8.1 cmt. a. The comments also explain that section 8.1 permits the
general enforcement of "cross-default" provisions, i.e., provisions that permit acceleration
of one mortgage debt in the event that a different loan goes into default. See id.
15. Id.
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jective facts (i.e., did the mortgagor sell the land, or fail to pro-
vide a financial statement, or fail to pay real estate taxes in
violation of the agreement?), without regard to external issues
such as impairment of the mortgagee's security or the mort-
gagor's personal circumstances. The comments justify this view
by reference to efficiency, noting that section 8.1 should provide
predictability in the enforcement of mortgage remedies and
avoid "difficult and time-consuming judicial inquiries into such
matters as the degree of mortgagor's negligence, the relative
hardship that acceleration imposes, and other subjective con-
cerns."
16
In section 8.1(d), however, the Mortgages Restatement recog-
nizes certain limitations upon the mortgagee's right to acceler-
ate the mortgage debt. Section 8.1(d) permits the mortgagor to
defeat acceleration and reinstate the mortgage obligation (by
curing any pre-acceleration defaults) if reinstatement is autho-
rized by statute or the mortgage documentation," or if the mort-
gagee has waived its right to accelerate either in writing or by
implication as a result of its conduct.'" In addition, section
8.1(d)(3) permits the mortgagor to reinstate the debt (again,
after curing any defaults) if "the mortgagee has engaged in
16. Id. cmt. e; see also id. reporters' note ("This section, in adopting the
traditional approach, reflects the view that, in the absence of fault on the part of the
mortgagee, relief from acceleration is better dealt with by 'arrearages' statutes or the
language of the mortgage documents. This section serves an important policy goal of
predictability in mortgage remedies.").
17. See id. § 8.1(d)(1). Most conventional residential mortgage documentation
contains a contractual reinstatement provision. See, e.g., 2 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 14.3, at 325 (3d ed. 1993) (showing form:
Federal National Mortgage Association-Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FNMA-FHLMC)-Uniform Mortgage-Deed of Trust Covenants-Single Family, 1 18). In
addition, a number of states have enacted legislation providing certain mortgagors with
statutory reinstatement privileges. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 2924c (West 1993); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 38-38-104(2.5) (1997) (certain nonmonetary defaults only); 735 ILL. COuP.
STAT. ANN. 5/15-1602 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.30 (West 1988); 41 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 404 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-31(1) (1994). In addition,
Chapters 11, 12, and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code provide debtors in possession of
mortgaged property with the opportunity to use the plan of reorganization as a means
to deaccelerate and reinstate a defaulted mortgage obligation. See CHARLES JORDAN
TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 11.3, at 768, § 12.3, at 900, § 13.2, at 959-61 (1997).
18. See MORTGAGES RESTATMENT, supra note 1, § 8.1(d)(2). Most typically, courts
have found waiver based upon a mortgagee's consistent pattern of accepting late
payments. See, e.g., Miller v. Uhrick, 706 P.2d 739 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Rosselot v.
Heimbrock, 561 N.E.2d 555 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Fairfield Fin. Group, Inc. v. Gawerc,
814 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App. 1991).
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fraud, bad faith, or other conduct making acceleration unconscio-
nable."1 9
Section 8.1 does not provide a positive definition of the term
"bad faith"; thus, the exact extent to which subsection (d)(3)
constrains the mortgagee's acceleration decision is unclear. The
comments provide some limited guidance, distinguishing be-
tween active misconduct by the mortgagee prior to its accelera-
tion decision (e.g., a statement that it will not enforce its reme-
dies, or will do so only after a certain period of time) and the
mortgagor's personal circumstances (e.g., the hardship that ac-
celeration would impose, or the mortgagor's ability to pay). Ac-
cording to the comments, the former might prevent the mort-
gagee from accelerating legally,2" but not the latter:
While mortgagee misconduct of the type described in Sub-
section (d) is an appropriate basis for relief from acceleration,
mortgagor's negligence, mistake, or improvidence are not. This
is the case even where the default is caused by circumstances
beyond mortgagor's control and where acceleration will cause
extreme hardship.... Under this Restatement, a mortgagee
who is guilty of no misconduct is ex ante permitted to rely on
its contract acceleration right without being subject to the
vagaries of mortgagor's financial and personal situation .... 21
The comments reinforce this point, using an example based
upon the facts of the landmark New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion in Graf v. Hope Building Corporation.2' The comments ex-
19. MORTGAGES RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 8.1(d)(3).
20. The comments provide two examples, Illustrations 16 and 17, in which the
mortgagee attempts to accelerate shortly after providing the mortgagor with oral
assurances that no acceleration would occur. See id. cmt. e, illus. 16 (payment due by
Monday, but mortgagee assures mortgagor that no acceleration will take place if
mortgagor pays by Friday at 5:00pm); id. cmt. e, illus. 17 (mortgagor loses job and
cannot pay mortgage installment, but requests time to sell land; mortgagee orally
assures mortgagor that it will wait for "a couple of months" before taking any action).
-In each case, the comments suggest that "estoppel, fraud, or bad faith provide
appropriate theories for defeating acceleration." Id. cmt. e.
21. Id. cmt. e.
22. 171 N.E. 884 (N.Y. 1930). In Graf, the mortgagor (a corporation) fell into
default because the corporation's bookkeeper made an arithmetical error in preparing
the check for the mortgage installment. The bookkeeper discovered the mistake, but
could not cure it immediately because the corporation's president had since left the
country on business. The mortgagee accelerated the debt, demanded payment of the
entire balance (approximately $300,000), and refused to reinstate the mortgage when
the mortgagor tendered the correct past due installment. When payment of the
accelerated balance did not occur, the mortgagee instituted foreclosure proceedings. In
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pressly reject the view expressed by Justice Cardozo (dissenting
in Graf) that equity justifies relieving the borrower from the
consequence of a trivial monetary default triggered by the bor-
rower's own mistake.
What the comments do not make clear is whether section 8.1
distinguishes between (on the one hand) active misconduct by
the mortgagee prior to the acceleration decision and (on the
other hand) the making of the decision itself in reliance upon an
objective default provision. In other words, can a decision to
accelerate a mortgage debt, based upon the occurrence of an
objective default as specified by the terms of the loan docu-
ments, ever constitute "bad faith"? Many courts have concluded
that the answer is "no," and that the creditor's reliance upon the
terms of the loan documents is sufficient to defeat a claim of bad
faith.23 Courts and commentators often advance efficiency con-
cerns to justify this view and use strong freedom-of-contract
rhetoric to inform the meaning of good faith in contract enforce-
ment. One of the more eloquent defenses of this view comes from
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2,
Inc. v. First Bank,24 in which Judge Easterbrook justifies an
its decision, a 4-3 majority of the New York Court of Appeals upheld the acceleration,
enforcing the bargained-for acceleration clause and suggesting that while the
mortgagee's conduct was "ungenerous," it did not involve "fraud, bad faith or
unconscionable conduct" by the mortgagee so as to justify the court's equitable
intervention on the mortgagor's behalf. Id. at 885. In dissent, Justice Cardozo argued
that the enforcement of acceleration provisions was subject to equitable limitations, and
that acceleration was not justified given the trivial nature of the borrower's mistake,
the borrower's ability to pay, the mortgagee's awareness of the mistake, and the harm
that the borrower would suffer if no relief were granted (by the time of the Court of
Appeals decision, of course, the country had entered the Depression and the mortgagor
likely had no hope of obtaining financing to satisfy the accelerated mortgage debt). See
id. at 889 (Cardozo, C.J., dissenting).
Illustration 19 is based precisely upon the facts in Graf, and Professor Grant Nelson
(who was the principal drafter of section 8.1) has suggested that his objective in section
8.1(d)(3) was to reject Cardozo's view that courts should use equitable powers to rescue
the borrower from the consequences of its own negligence or mistake.
23. See, e.g., In re Nantahala Village, Inc., 976 F.2d 876, 881-82 (4th Cir. 1992);
Terry A. Lambert Plumbing, Inc. v. Western Sec. Bank, 934 F.2d 976, 982-83 (8th Cir.
1991); Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir.
1990); Van Arnem Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 176 F. Supp. 1220,
1223 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. David Steed & Assocs., Inc., 825 P.2d
79, 83 (Idaho 1992); Brown v. Weeres Indus., Inc., 375 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); Bennco Liquidating Co. v. Ameritrust Co., 621 N.E.2d 760, 762-63 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993).
24. 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
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extremely narrow view of "good faith" by reference to the need
for certainty and predictability in contracting:
Firms that have negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce
them to the letter, even to the great discomfort of their trading
partners, without being mulcted for lack of "good faith". Al-
though courts often refer to the obligation of good faith that
exists in every contractual relation, this is not an invitation to
the court to decide whether one party ought to have exercised
privileges expressly reserved in the document. "Good faith" is
a compact reference to an implied undertaking not to take
opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been
contemplated at the time of drafting, and which therefore was
not resolved explicitly by the parties. When the contract is
silent, principles of good faith-such as the UCC's standard of
honesty in fact.. .- fill the gap. They do not block use of terms
that actually appear in the contract.
We do not doubt the force of the proverb that the letter
killeth, while the spirit giveth life. Literal implementation of
unadorned language may destroy the essence of the venture.
Few people pass out of childhood without learning fables about
genies, whose wickedly literal interpretation of their "mas-
ters'" wishes always leads to calamity. Yet knowledge that
literal enforcement means some mismatch between the par-
ties' expectation and the outcome does not imply a general
duty of "kindness" in performance, or of judicial oversight into
whether a party had "good cause" to act as it did. Parties to a
contract are not each others' fiduciaries; they are not bound to
treat customers with the same consideration reserved for their
families. Any attempt to add an overlay of 'Just cause".., to
the exercise of contractual privileges would reduce commercial
certainty and breed costly litigation.25
The judicial efficiencies gained from this view of bad faith
are easily seen by considering the introductory hypotheticals in
Part I and evaluating how a court would view Randolph's chal-
lenges to the Bank's decision to call in his line of credit. Exam-
25. Id. at 1357 (citations omitted). Notably, the Seventh Circuit based its
interpretation of "good faith" upon the existing language of UCC section 1-203 which,
as discussed in Part III, originally meant only "honesty in fact," i.e., does the actor
sincerely believe that its conduct is authorized by the law? See infra notes 47-61 and
accompanying text. As Part III explains, through the UCC revision process, the
principal architects of the UCC have abandoned this narrow conception of good faith
in favor of a duty informed by the observance of reasonable commercial standards. See
infra notes 77-93 and accompanying text.
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ple One (in which Randolph is insolvent), of course, poses no
analytical difficulty under any conception of bad faith; Randolph
has violated the terms of the loan agreement and his insolvency
poses a threat to the Bank's prospects of repayment. Likewise,
the Bank's decisions in Examples Two, Three, and Four would
not involve "bad faith" under the Easterbrook view. Randolph
may argue that he never expected that the Bank would call his
loan based upon a technical, six-day default, especially if that
action was imprudent (as in Example Two, in which the Bank
mistakenly perceives its security is threatened); motivated by a
desire to obtain a higher interest rate (as in Example Three); or
motivated by a change in Bank lending policies (as in Example
Four). Under this view, however, the literal terms of the con-
tract authorize the Bank's action, and the "mismatch" between
Randolph's expectations and the Bank's intentions is irrele-
vant.26
Whether courts will interpret section 8.1 in equally sweeping
fashion, however, is conjecture. Although the comments to sec-
tion 8.1 incorporate some relatively strong freedom-of-contract
rhetoric, they provide no examples or illustrations involving a
"bad faith" challenge to a mortgagee's decision to accelerate
based upon a nonmonetary objective default provision, nor to a
decision involving a clear "mismatch" between the expectations
of the mortgagor and the mortgagee. Furthermore, even assum-
ing that section 8.1 advances a freedom-of-contract view akin to
that of Easterbrook, section 8.1's use of the term "bad
faith"-informed as that term is by the rhetoric associated with
its twin "good faith"-creates some uncertainty about how
broadly courts will interpret section 8.1(d)(3). Given the histori-
cal origins of the term "good faith," that term can be, and often
has been, understood by courts to invite ex post review of the
reasonable expectations of contracting parties and ex post judg-
26. See Kham & Nate's Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1357. Exactly how the Bank would fare
under Easterbrok's view is unclear in Example Five, in which the Bank's action is
motivated by the loan officer's personal animus. Easterbrook's rhetoric suggests that
Randolph's acceptance of a provision authorizing acceleration if he failed to provide
financial statements makes all other circumstances irrelevant; under this view, the
Bank's action would withstand challenge by Randolph. However, it seems dubious to
suggest that Randolph, at the time he entered into the loan agreement, would have
contemplated that the Bank would act in such an arbitrary and capricious fashion, and
courts have often applied the duty of good faith in a fashion that protects the borrower
against such pretextual conduct. See infra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
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ment that one party's enforcement of the contract did not com-
port with those reasonable expectations.
Furthermore, this broader conception of good faith perfor-
mance has obtained significant influence through its adoption in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,27 and will gain more in-
fluence as it continues to be promulgated throughout the Uni-
form Commercial Code.2" As a result, it seems likely that some
courts will use the broad rhetoric of good faith as a means to
evaluate the objective reasonableness of a contracting party's
enforcement decisions in marginal cases-a result that may
work at odds with the stated objectives of section 8.1. To explain
why, Part III of this Article retraces the historical origins of the
term "good faith" and the evolution of the duty of good faith
performance and enforcement in American commercial law.
III. "GooD FAITH"--UNDERSTANDING ITS ORIGINS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND PARAMETERS
Today, it is generally accepted that a duty of good faith gov-
erns the performance and enforcement of promissory notes and
credit agreements secured by real or personal property.29 Never-
theless, courts have struggled mightily to give practical sub-
stance to this general duty. Does good faith constitute merely a
state of mind (i.e., the sincere subjective belief that one is acting
in accordance with the law, regardless of the correctness of that
belief)? Or does it require adherence to external standards of
moral behavior (i.e., actions consistent with behavior one might
expect from similarly situated commercial parties)?0 To provide
a framework for understanding why section 8.1 may not produce
the certainty and predictability it seeks to achieve, Part III
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) [hereinafter CONTRACTS
RESTATEMENT]; see infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 85, 91 and accompanying text.
29. The enforcement of negotiable promissory notes secured by realty and/or
personalty is governed by the provisions of the UCC, which from its initial
promulgation has provided that "[elvery contract or duty within [the UCCI imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995). The
enforcement of nonnegotiable notes is governed by the common law of contracts, under
which courts have (as suggested infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text) implied a
duty of good faith and fair dealing as manifested in the provisions of the CONTRACTS
RESTATEMENT, supra note 27.
30. See Saul Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 TuL. L. REV. 1645, 1649 (1997) ("It has
been said that, in the legal context, good faith has both a psychological and an ethical
component.").
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traces the historical origins of the "good faith" concept, its intro-
duction into American law, its incorporation into the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), and its "restoration" in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts and revised UCC.
A. The Origins of Good Faith-Roman and Continental
Antecedents
In the Roman law of obligations, the terms bona fides and
stricti juris served to designate the two primary categories of
obligations. The stricti juris obligation designated the formal
agreement, typically made in ritual stipulation;3 ' these formal
agreements included agreements involving the loan of money,
the guarantee, and certain kinds of security.32 In contrast, the
bona fides obligation designated the nonritualistic, informal
consensual contracts that covered most Roman commercial ac-
tivity.33 The different judicial treatment of the stipulation and
the consensual contracts reflected the normative force that Ro-
man law ascribed to the concept of bona fides. Courts strictly
interpreted the ritual stipulation to limit the parties' respective
obligations to those expressly stated by the parties; the judge
retained no discretion in fashioning relief.34 In determining dis-
putes arising out of the consensual agreements, however, Ro-
man judges found significant flexibility in the concept of bona
fides:
In the actions on the consensual contracts, on the other
hand, the judge ... was directed to order the defendant, if
unsuccessful, to pay the plaintiff whatever he found to be due
ex fide bona, that is to say, in accordance with the require-
ments of good faith; and this cast on the judge ... the burden
of deciding what the defendant ought in good faith to have
done, in other words what kind of performance the contract
called for. This meant that, in contrast to the stipulation,
where all the terms had to be expressed, the parties would be
31. See WILLI WARWICK BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 413-15 (2d ed.
1950).
32. See FREDERICK H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 93-94,
121-22, 126, 137 (1955).
33. See id. at 120-21; see also, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance
and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L.
REV. 666, 669 (1963); Jill Pride Anderson, Comment, Lender Liability for Breach of the
Obligation of Good Faith Performance, 36 EMORY L.J. 917, 919 n.10 (1987).
34. See LAWSON, supra note 32, at 124.
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bound not only by the terms they had actually agreed to, but
by all the terms that were naturally implied in their agree-
ment.3 5
Thus, under Roman law, bona. fides was not merely a "tool for
interpretation," but a basis for imposing upon contracting par-
ties obligations that were beyond the express terms of their
agreement yet consistent with their unexpressed, reasonable
expectations.36
The influence of the Roman bona fides and its incorporation
of external standards of reasonable behavior significantly influ-
enced the development of commercial law throughout continen-
tal Europe. In France, the first modern civil code required that
all contracts be performed in good faith, 7 rejecting the formal
Roman law distinction between stricti juris and bona fides con-
tracts." Likewise, the Swiss Civil Code provides that all persons
are bound to exercise their rights and perform their obligations
in accordance with the rules of good faith.3" Further, the Swiss
code draws a direct connection between good faith and abuse of
rights, providing that the law does not protect the "manifest
abuse" of a right.4 ° In this regard the Swiss code suggests that a
contracting party acts in bad faith when he or she uses a con-
tractual right "as an instrument to obtain an advantage which
lies beyond that which.., the parties contemplated at the time
the contract was entered into."4 The Dutch code uses a compa-
rable term, prescribing that all contracting parties must conduct
35. Id. at 124-25 (citations omitted).
36. See Litvinoff, supra note 30, at 1652 ("[Tjhe [bona fides] standard had the
ability to create an obligation that bound a contracting party to whatever could be
expected of a person who acted in such a case with probity and rectitude, an obligation
that thus came into existence regardless of any formality at its inception. The Roman
bona fides allowed the Roman judge great discretion in his determination of that which
parties to an informal contract, acting as boni viri, or honest men, could expect from
each other . . . ." (footnote omitted)).
37. See CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 1134 (Fr.).
38. See Litvinoff, supra note 30, at 1653 ("By virtue of that crucial rejection, in
French law all contracts, since the enactment of the Code civil, have bound the parties
to all those attending obligations that, although not made express by them, are
prescribed by equitd, usage, or the law, according to the nature of their contract." (citing
3 TOULLiER, LE DRorr CIrm FRANQAiS 391-92 (1833))); see also LAWSON, supra note 32,
at 150 & n.16 ("French authors simply say that the distinction has not been received
into their law.").
39. See CODE CIVIL SUISSE [CC] art. 2, $ 1 (Switz.).
40. Id. J 2.
41. Litvinoff, supra note 30, at 1661.
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themselves and their affairs according to the demands of "reason
and equity."42 Finally, the German Civil Code provides the most
striking example of the development of good faith in commercial
law. The German Code's duty of good faith (Treu und Glauben)
incorporates an external standard of reasonableness, prescribing
that a party must perform or enforce an agreement in accor-
dance with both the established standards of the community and
the confidence bestowed upon her by the other party.4 German
courts have applied this duty of good faith with striking breadth,
most notably during the post-war reconstruction period as a
basis for rewriting fixed-price contractual obligations that would
otherwise have been significantly devalued by hyperinflation.4
B. "Good Faith" Comes to America
As Professor Farnsworth has explained, "good faith" as origi-
nated in Roman law and developed in continental legal systems
had its primary meaning in the context of good faith perfor-
mance of agreements; its primary significance was in implying
terms into the agreement consistent with the reasonable unex-
pressed expectations of the contracting parties.45 This conception
of good faith performance also influenced the development of
commercial law in England; Holdsworth described this broad
conception of good faith as a central characteristic of English
mercantile law:
[Tihe canon law was able to exert this influence upon the de-
velopment of commercial law [because of] the manner in which
the Canon law put into legal form the religious and moral
42. CIVIL CODE OF THE NETHERLANDS art. 6; see also Litvinoff, supra note 30, at
1655.
43. See § 157 BURGERLICHES GESETMZBUCH [BGB] (F.R.G.) (stating that contracts
shall be interpreted according to the requirements of good faith, ordinary usage being
taken into consideration); id. § 242 (stating that the debtor is bound to perform
according to the requirements of good faith, ordinary usage being taken into
consideration.); see also 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 155-56 (Tony Weir trans., 2d ed. 1987) (noting that the German code,
as interpreted by courts, has emphasized "mutuality of social responsibility" and led to
the "'moralization' of contractual relations"); Litvinoff, supra note 30, at 1654.
44. For a discussion of these developments, see Werner F. Ebke & Bettina M.
Steinhauer, The Doctrine of Good Faith in German Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND
FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 182-84 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995) and 2
ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 43, at 558-63.
45. See Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 670.
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ideas which, at this period, coloured the economic thought of
all the nations of Western Europe....
.T. iThe canonist's view that faith should be kept, in
whatever form the promise was expressed, helped forward the
development of forms of commercial contract ... ; it assisted
the legislature to deal adequately with the new forms of fraud
and sharp practice rendered possible by a more elaborate orga-
nization of commerce; and thus it contributed to enforce those
high standards of good faith and fair dealing* which are the
very life of trade.46
By the nineteenth century, however, the scope of "good faith"
began to narrow as commercial interests directed judicial atten-
tion toward barriers to the free trade of goods and the market-
ability of commercial paper. As Professor Farnsworth explained:
Good faith purchase-not good faith performance-was the
concern of the day, and the courts set about the task of defin-
ing "good faith" for this purpose. The leading cases involved
the test of "good faith" for a holder in due course of a negotia-
ble instrument. In 1801, in Lawson v. Weston, Lord Kenyon
ruled that the holder need not make diligent inquiry when he
takes the instrument, and.., he introduced the subjective test
of actual good faith, the test of "the pure heart and the empty
head." In 1824, in Gill v. Cubitt, the subjective test was dis-
carded for an objective test that required the holder to exercise
the prudence and caution of a reasonable man.... But by 1836
Gill v. Cubitt had been overruled in England and by the end of
the nineteenth century most of the American states had
adopted a subjective test for good faith purchase.47
Professor Farnsworth noted that this development resulted in
two widespread and mistaken assumptions-first, that good
faith mattered only in the purchase context; and second, that its
meaning was purely subjective and limited to honesty in fact.'
As a result, Farnsworth suggested, the notion that the duty of
good faith performance established an objective standard of com-
46. 5 SIR WILLivi HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 80-81 (1966)
(footnotes omitted).
47. Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 670 (footnotes omitted).
48. "The uniform acts that preceded the [UCC] contain upwards of fifty references
to good faith, and not once is that term used in the sense of good faith performance.
A subjective test of 'honesty in fact' is used consistently throughout the uniform acts."
Id. at 670-71.
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mercial behavior gradually faded from view,4" leading at least
one English scholar to express the view, as of the mid-1950s,
that there was no general positive duty of good faith perfor-
mance imposed upon contracting parties.50
C. The Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
1. The codification of good faith as subjective honesty
As the impetus for a standard commercial code gained mo-
mentum, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code at-
tempted to challenge the prevailing "misconception" of good
faith as mere honesty. From its original promulgation, UCC
section 1-203 has provided that "[e]very contract or duty [gov-
erned by the UCCI imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement."5' As originally proposed, the UCC
would have provided a positive definition of the term "good
faith" that would have restored the historical duty of good faith
performance as informed by external objective standards of con-
duct. In the original May 1949 draft of the UCC, section 1-201
defined "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transac-
tion concerned. Good faith includes good faith toward all prior
parties and observance by a person of the reasonable commercial
standards of any business or trade in which he is engaged."52
Had this definition survived in the UCC as finally promulgated,
the relevant inquiry would have focused explicitly upon a con-
tracting party's conduct and whether it adhered to accepted
moral standards within the relevant community53-- i.e., was the
party's conduct consistent with conduct that one might expect
from a reasonable commercial actor under the circumstances? 54
49. See id.
50. See Raphael Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 16,
25 (1956) ("[Iln English law there is no overriding general positive duty of good faith
imposed on the parties to a contract." (footnote omitted)).
51. Compare U.C.C. § 1-203 (Draft May 1949), quoted in Robert S. Summers,
"Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 207 (1968), with U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995).
52. U.C.C. § 1-201(18) (Draft May 1949) (emphasis added), quoted in Summers,
supra note 51, at 207.
53. See Litvinoff, supra note 30, at 1649 ("It has been said that, in a legal
context, good faith has both a psychological and an ethical component.... The latter
would consist in conducting oneself according to moral standards, and is designated as
good faith-probity, or good faith.honesty, and is germane to ideas of loyalty and respect
for the pledged word." (footnote omitted)).
54. As Farnsworth explained:
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Almost immediately, however, the May 1949 draft encoun-
tered opposition from commercial interests alarmed by the po-
tential impact of such a broad conception of the duty of good
faith. In September 1950, the Committee on the Proposed Com-
mercial Code of the American Bar Association Section on Corpo-
ration, Banking and Business Law released a report criticizing
the proposed "good faith" definition. The Committee, concerned
that an "objective" formulation would complicate the appropriate
resolution of cases involving good faith purchase, suggested that
the term be limited to "honesty in fact in the conduct or transac-
tion concerned and the absence of trickery, deceit or improper
purpose."55 The Committee provided three justifications for its
objection: (1) the average person understood "good faith" to
mean "honesty;"56 (2) the phrase "observance of reasonable com-
mercial standards" implied the identification of usages, customs,
and practices; however, the determination of exactly what us-
ages, customs, and practices control would produce significant
litigation;57 and (3) litigation and judicial definition of "reason-
able commercial standards" could have the effect of perpetuating
those standards indefinitely, thereby preventing the evolution
Good faith performance has always required the cooperation of one party
where it was necessary in order that the other might secure the expected
benefits of the contract. And the standard for determining what
cooperation was required has always been an objective standard, based on
the decency, fairness or reasonableness of the community and not on the
individual's own beliefs as to what might be decent, fair or reasonable.
Both common sense and tradition dictate an objective standard for good
faith performance.
Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 672.
55. Walter D. Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 BUS. LAW. 113, 128
(1951).
56. "Although we recognize that there are some court decisions that have added
to 'honesty in fact' in the meaning of 'good faith' the requirement to observe some
commercial standards of conduct, nevertheless we believe that to the average person
and the average lawyer, 'good faith' signifies primarily 'honesty.'" Id.
57.
Assuming, however, that within the term [good faith] there should be added
to 'honesty' some meaning of 'commercial decency' the phrase 'observance of
reasonable commercial standards' carries with it the implication of usages,
customs or practices. If this is true there immediately arises the very difficult
problem of what usages, customs and practices are those intended to be
included in the standard. Any lawyer who has ever attempted to prove what
a usage or custom is will immediately recognize how litigious such a standard
could grow to be.
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and development of commercial practices over time.5" In a politi-
cal compromise, the drafters deleted the reference to "reasonable
commercial standards" in Article 1, inserting that broader defi-
nition only in limited contexts (such as Article 2 provisions re-
garding the conduct of merchants)."
As eventually promulgated, then, the original UCC ex-
pressed its general duty of good faith in a purely subjective fash-
ion, focusing only upon a party's state of mind in the psychologi-
cal sense-i.e., does the party sincerely believe (even if that
belief is mistaken) that she is acting in accordance with the
law?'0 This purely subjective view of good faith fits nicely with
the freedom-of-contract view of acceleration enforcement articu-
lated by Easterbrook;61 presumably, if the loan documents re-
serve to the lender the right to accelerate based upon an objec-
tive default and the objective event of default has taken place,
then the lender almost certainly has a sincere belief that its
decision to accelerate complies with the law. As such, that deci-
sion would appear to satisfy the good faith enforcement stan-
dard of UCC section 1-203. As discussed below, however, al-
though this subjective formulation of good faith survives to the
58.
More serious still is the possibility that "reasonable commercial standards"
could mean usage, customs or practices existing at any particular time. This
could have the very bad effect of freezing customs and practices into
particular molds and thereby destroy the flexibility absolutely essential to the
gradual evolution of commercial practices,--a result which the Code draftsmen
certainly would never desire.
Id.
59. See Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 812 (1958); Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 673-75; Summers,
supra note 51, at 208-13. In the original official comments, the drafters reemphasized
the nature of this compromise and the contextual dichotomy it created:
"Good faith" whenever it is used in the Code, means at least [honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned]. In certain Articles, by specific
provision, additional requirements are made applicable. To illustrate, in the
Article on Sales, Section 2-103, good faith is expressly defined as including in
the case of a merchant observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade, so that throughout that Article wherever a merchant
appears in the case an inquiry into his observance of such standards is
necessary to determine his good faith.
U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 19 (1962) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
60. See Litvinoff, supra note 30, at 1649 ("It has been said that, in a legal
context, good faith has both a psychological and an ethical component. The former
would consist of a belief that one is acting according to the law . . .
61. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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present day in Article 1 of the UCC, its impact has been steadily
eroded through the UCC revision process in favor of a view that
incorporates external standards of commercially reasonable
behavior.
2. Intermission-the UCC, section 1-203, section 1-208, and
good faith in the context of acceleration
Much of the confusion in judicial decisions regarding the
duty of good faith as applied to the acceleration of a debt has
arisen as a result of confusion regarding the proper relationship
between UCC sections 1-203 and 1-208. Therefore, this Article
will take a brief detour to elaborate upon the relationship of
these two provisions. On its face, section 1-203's duty of good
faith applies to every contract governed by the UCC; thus, a
party must act with good faith to enforce the acceleration provi-
sions of a note or contract governed by the UCC. Nevertheless, it
is not clear that this duty, when limited by section 1-201(19)'s
subjective definition of "good faith," should provide a significant
constraint upon the judgment of an accelerating creditor. As
noted above, under the UCC as originally promulgated, the gen-
eral duty of good faith in performance or enforcement required
the creditor only to act with "honesty in fact."6 2 As Professor
Summers has noted in his work on good faith performance and
enforcement of sales contracts, the subjective standard should
rule out claims that a party acted in bad faith due to her negli-
gence (e.g., such as by accelerating based upon insecurity when
any reasonable person would have concluded that the party's
position was secure) or because she openly acted in a fashion
inconsistent with the "spirit" of the bargain (e.g., by accelerating
based upon an objective default under circumstances outside the
expectations of the borrower at the time of the contract), 3
62. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text. Since 1990, however, Article
3 has defined good faith to include not only honesty in fact, but also "the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1990).
Further, the pending revision of Article 9 will likely define good faith so as to
incorporate "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C.
§ 9-102(23) (Proposed Draft 1997).
63. See Summers, supra note 51, at 210-12. Summers particularly noted that the
subjective standard would not appear to reach "forms of bad faith that do not involve
dishonesty, let alone negligence-for example, openly abusing the power to break off
negotiations, openly taking unfair advantage of bargaining power, openly acting
capriciously or openly undercutting another's performance." Id. at 210.
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a. Objective defaults. Consistent with this view, the origi-
nal UCC subjective duty of good faith should present no signifi-
cant basis for challenge to an acceleration based upon an objec-
tive default provision in the credit agreement. Consider the
introductory hypotheticals; in each, Randolph committed an
objective default (his failure to provide the required financial
statements in a timely fashion), the agreement permitted accel-
eration based upon that default, and the Bank openly invoked
that default provision as a basis for accelerating. Thus, in each
example, the Bank would have a sincere belief, based upon the
language of its written agreement, that the law authorized its
conduct. Under this view, in each example the Bank would have
enforced its rights in "good faith" under section 1-203; thus,
application of the original UCC subjective good faith standard
should produce decisions that are generally consistent with the
Easterbrook "freedom-of-contract" view of acceleration described
in Part II.6
64. Many decisions interpreting UCC section 1-203 have expressed this strong
freedom-of-contract view of good faith. One of the most notable examples is the
Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Brown v. Weeres Indus., 375 N.W.2d 64 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985). In 1982, Weeres Industries, Inc. (Weeres) sold its pontoon boat and
water bicycle manufacturing business to Gordon Brown and Clinton Lee, who executed
an installment note for a portion of the purchase price and who granted Weeres a
security interest in all assets of the business. Brown and Lee also signed a three-year
lease for Weeres's existing plant, along with an option to purchase the plant at the
conclusion of the lease. The security agreement provided that the collateral would
remain at its existing location and would not be removed from that location without
prior written consent of Weeres. See id. at 65. Approximately two years later, however,
Brown and Lee decided that business concerns justified relocating to a different site in
the immediate area; accordingly, they communicated to Weeres their intention not to
renew the lease. Weeres objected to any relocation and stated that it would accelerate
the maturity of the note if Brown and Lee removed the collateral from its existing
location.
Brown and Lee filed suit, arguing that Weeres's refusal to consent constituted a bad
faith effort to compel Brown and Lee to renew the lease. In the suit, Brown and Lee
sought a declaration that they could relocate the collateral without triggering a default
and acceleration under the security agreement. See id. at 66. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Brown and Lee, reasoning that they were current on their note
payments, sales and inventory levels had increased (improving Weeres's secured
position), and the new site was in the immediate vicinity of the old site; therefore,
Weeres had no legitimate basis to feel insecure about its prospects for repayment, and
acceleration was improper. See id. at 67.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, however, and remanded the case for
entry of summary judgment in favor of Weeres. The court held that the terms of the
security agreement did not require Weeres to have a reasonable basis for withholding
consent, nor did the duty of good faith require that Weeres provide a reasonable
justification for withholding consent. Because Brown and Lee violated the literal terms
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b. Subjective defaults. In UCC section 1-208, the drafters
provided a specific application of the general duty of good faith,
articulated to govern acceleration decisions in which a creditor
acts pursuant to an insecurity clause. Section 1-208 provides, in
pertinent part:
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest
may accelerate payment or performance or require collateral
or additional collateral "at will" or "when he deems himself
insecure" or in words of similar import shall be construed to
mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith
believes that the prospect of payment or performance is im-
paired.65
Section 1-208 has resulted in some interpretational quandaries.
Does section 1-208 govern all optional acceleration decisions, or
only those decisions based specifically upon insecurity or "at
will" language in the agreement?" Is it sufficient that the credi-
tor honestly believes that its security or likelihood of payment is
threatened (even if that belief is mistaken), or must the credi-
tor's belief be reasonable under the circumstances? 7 Litigation
of the security agreement, Weeres had the right to accelerate the debt, regardless of
whether the violation posed a meaningful threat to Weeres' prospects for repayment:
Under the clear and unambiguous terms of this security agreement, the
collateral may not be removed from the leased premises without [Weeres']
prior written consent. The security agreement does not provide that
withholding of such consent must be reasonable. Although [Brown and Lee]
may have failed to anticipate that they might have to pay off the debt before
removal of the collateral, this is insufficient reason to ignore the contract's
literal meaning.
Id.
65. U.C.C. § 1-208 (1995) (emphasis added). Section 1-208 goes on to provide that
"It]he burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom the power
has been exercised." Id.
66. As discussed infra in notes 98-118 and accompanying text, some courts have
concluded that section 1-208's standard applies to all acceleration decisions that result
from a creditor's exercise of its option to accelerate, regardless of the nature of the
default. See, e.g., Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979). In
contrast, most courts have concluded that section 1-208 does not apply when the
creditor elects to accelerate based upon an objective default. See, e.g., Bowen v. Danna,
637 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Ark. 1982).
67. See Susan A. Wegner, Comment, Section 1-208: "Good Faith" and the Need for
a Uniform Standard, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 639, 639-40 (1990) (discussing the different
interpretations of good faith and reviewing cases applying various standards); see also
Anderson, supra note 33; Darlene M. Nowak, Note, Standards for Insecurity Acceleration
Under Section 1-208 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal for Reform, 13 MICH.
J.L. REFoma 623 (1980).
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under section 1-208 has not produced universal consensus re-
garding these questions, and the judicial uncertainty is a prod-
uct of at least two factors: section 1-208's unclear relation to
section 1-203, and the commentary of one of the principal UCC
drafters in his ex post explanations of the purpose of section 1-
208.
First, courts have struggled to identify the correct relation-
ship between sections 1-203 and 1-208. If section 1-208 requires
only subjective good faith (i.e., the creditor's belief in its insecu-
rity must be honest, but not necessarily reasonable), that would
seem to render section 1-208 purely duplicative of section 1-203.
After all, section 1-203 already imposes a subjective duty of good
faith in the performance and enforcement of every contractual
obligation. As a result, one might reason that the drafters must
have intended section 1-208 to apply a higher standard to discre-
tionary accelerations or accelerations based upon insecurity.
Under this view, accelerations governed by section 1-208 would
have to be objectively reasonable.6" The comments to sections 1-
203 and 1-208, however, belie this view. The comments to sec-
tion 1-203 suggest that the drafters understood section 1-208
merely as an illustrative application of the duty of good faith as
expressed in section 1-203.69 The comments to section 1-208
reinforce this view, suggesting that the drafters added section 1-
208 not to create a different good faith standard, but merely to
68. See, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank of S. Me., Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 15 n.2 (lst Cir. 1987)
(dictum); AVEMCO, 603 F.2d at 1378-80; Sheppard Fed. Credit Union v. Palmer, 408
F.2d 1369, 1371 (5th Cir. 1969); In re Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc., 87 B.R. 752, 765-
66 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 97 B.R. 721 (D. Mass. 1989);
Kupka v. Morey, 541 P.2d 740, 747 (Alaska 1975); Richards Eng'rs, Inc. v. Spanel, 745
P.2d 1031, 1032-33 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 329
N.E.2d 620, 623-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Black v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 437 So.
2d 26, 29-30 (Miss. 1983); Blaine v. G.M-.AC., 370 N.Y.S.2d 323, 327 (Monroe County
Ct. 1975); Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 688 P.2d 42, 45 n.5 (Okla. 1984);
American Bank v. Waco Airmotive, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 163, 171-72 (Tex. App. 1991).
69. In elaborating upon the "good faith" obligation contained in section 1-203, the
original comments provided:
Particular applications of this general principle appear in specific provisions
of the Act such as the option to accelerate at will, the right to cure a
defective delivery of goods, the duty of a merchant buyer who has rejected
goods to effect salvage operations, substituted performance, and failure of
presupposed conditions. The concept, however, is broader than any of these
illustrations and applies generally... to the performance or enforcement of
every contract or duty within this Act.
U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. (1962) (citations omitted).
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make clear that because of the general duty of good faith ex-
pressed in section 1-203, courts should not invalidate agree-
ments permitting acceleration "at will" as illusory promises. 70
Accordingly, it seems doubtful that section 1-208 "ratcheted up"
the standard to which a creditor should be held in accelerating
at will or based upon insecurity. As originally promulgated, the
combined language of sections 1-201(19) and 1-208 only required
that the creditor honestly believe that its security or prospect for
repayment was threatened, even if that belief was mistaken or
unfounded.7'
Nevertheless, the notion that the original section 1-208 did
"ratchet up" the standard received a boost from the scholarship
of Grant Gilmore, one of the principal drafters of Article 9. In his
treatise on secured transactions, Gilmore argued that section 1-
208 required that acceleration based upon insecurity must be
objectively reasonable:
The cases are quite clear that the insecurity clause will not
be allowed to operate as a charter of irresponsibility. A "rea-
sonable man" rule emerges from the cases. The creditor has
the right to accelerate if, under all the circumstances, a rea-
70. The original comments to section 1-208 provided:
The increased use of acceleration clauses . .. has led to some confusion
in the cases as to the effect to be given to a clause which seemingly grants
the power of an acceleration at the whim and caprice of one party. This
Section is intended to make clear that despite language which can be so
construed and which further might be held to make the agreement void as
against public policy or to make the contract illusory or too indefinite for
enforcement, the clause means that the option is to be exercised only in the
good faith belief that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired.
U.C.C. § 1-208 cmt. (1962).
71. A significant number of courts have interpreted section 1-208 in precisely this
way. See, e.g., Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa
1975) ("The [debtor] has not adduced substantial proof that the Bank's concern about
the security of its loans, whether or not reasonable, was not genuine ... ."); Van Horn
v. Van De Wol, Inc., 497 P.2d 252, 254 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) ("[Njegligence is
irrelevant to good faith. The standard is what the plaintiff actually knew, or believed
he knew, not what he could or should have known."); see also, e.g., Klingbiel v.
Commercial Credit Corp., 439 F.2d 1303, 1308 & n.12 (10th Cir. 1971); Paine Webber
Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, 539 A.2d 595, 598 n.1 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988); Quest
v. Barnett Bank, 397 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Ginn v. Citizens &
S. Nat'l Bank, 243 S.E.2d 528, 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978); Van Bibber v. Norris, 419
N.E.2d 115, 124 (Ind. 1981); Jackson v. State Bank, 488 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Iowa 1992);
Karner v. Willis, 700 P.2d 582, 584 (Kan. Ct. App.), aff'd, 710 P.2d 21 (Kan. 1985); Fort
Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); J. R. Hale
Contracting Co. v. United N.M. Bank, 799 P.2d 581, 591 (N.M. 1990).
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sonable man, motivated by good faith, would have done so....
The Code adopts such a rule in §1-208 ....
Under Gilmore's view, a party could accelerate for insecurity
only if that decision was both objectively reasonable and subjec-
tively honest. Lest he be misunderstood, Gilmore went on to
elaborate this point while discussing the proper allocation of the
burden of proof:
One court has suggested that the burden [of proving good
faith] should be on the creditor on the ground that "a pure
state of mind" on the creditor's part is involved. That however,
seems to be an inaccurate statement. The creditor's state of
mind is clear enough-he decided to accelerate-and the ques-
tion under the "reasonable man" rule ... is whether he had a
right to feel that way. Presumably under the Code's burden of
proof rule, a debtor's testimony that he knew of no reason why
the creditor should have felt insecure, unimpeached on cross-
examination or unrebutted by the creditor would get him to
the jury 73
Gilmore's interpretation of section 1-208 appears unfaithful both
to the statutory language of the 1962 Code and the history sur-
rounding the excision of the objective reasonableness standard
from the May 1949 draft. 74 Nevertheless, Gilmore's interpreta-
tion of section 1-208 gained favor in subsequent judicial deci-
sions." Indeed, as discussed in Part IV, Gilmore's view even led
72. 2 GRANT GIMORE, SECURrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.4, at 1197
(1965).
73. Id. at 1198 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
74. One might defend this view of section 1-208 more narrowly by arguing that
even under a subjective standard of good faith, the trier of fact legitimately may
consider the reasonableness of a creditor's action in evaluating the creditor's credibility,
i.e., whether that party's allegedly honest belief of insecurity was sincere. See, e.g., Hale
Contracting, 799 P.2d at 591 ("Even under a subjective test of good faith the trier of
fact may evaluate the credibility of a creditor's claim and in doing so may take into
account the reasonableness of that claim."); Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 672 (same).
The language of Gilmore's treatise, however, reflects that Gilmore clearly viewed section
1-208 as establishing an objective reasonableness standard.
75. See, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank, 821 F.2d 9, 15 n.2 (1st Cir. 1987) (dictum, citing
GILMORE); Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1378-1380 (9th Cir. 1979);
Sheppard Fed. Credit Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369, 1371 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969) (quoting
GILMORE); In re Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc., 87 B.R. 752, 765-66 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1988), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 97 B.R. 721 (D. Mass. 1989); Kupka v. Morey,
541 P.2d 740, 747 (Alaska 1975); Richards Eng'rs, Inc. v. Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031, 1033
(Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting GILmORE); Black v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 437 So.
2d 26, 29-30 (Miss. 1983) (quoting GILMORE); Blaine v. G.M.C., 370 N.Y.S.2d 323, 327
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the Ninth Circuit to conclude that the "good faith" standard
required objective reasonableness even for accelerations based
upon objective defaults (although section 1-208, on its face, does
not purport to govern such decisions).76
D. The Duty of "Good Faith" Stages a Rally-The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts
Over the decades following the promulgation of the UCC, a
number of leading scholars offered pointed criticism of the deci-
sion to excise the objective reasonableness standard from the
May 1949 draft. Professor Allen Farnsworth decried the decision
as one that "enfeebled" the duty of good faith and rendered it
devoid of meaningful force.77 Professor Robert Summers argued
that the Code's definition of good faith distorted the proper un-
derstanding of good faith performance;7" further, he argued that
good faith could not be defined meaningfully only in terms of
honesty.79 These criticisms informed the deliberations of the
American Law Institute, then engaged in the early stages of
work on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts [hereinafter Con-
tracts Restatement]. When eventually promulgated, the Con-
tracts Restatement reflected the influence of the criticisms of
(Monroe County Ct. 1975); Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 688 P.2d 42, 45 n.5 (Okia.
1984) (citing GILAIORE); American Bank v. Waco Airmotive, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 163, 171-72
(Tex. App. 1991).
76. See AVEMCO, 603 F.2d at 1378-80 (9th Cir. 1979); see also infra notes 98-118
and accompanying text.
77. See Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 673-74 ("The demise of the single, unitary
definition of good faith [including reference to reasonable commercial standards] ....
was one of the major casualties during the drafting of the Code. The American Bar
Association section recognized this and suggested that if the definition of good faith
were limited to honesty in fact, the general obligation of good faith could be eliminated
as unnecessary. Although not eliminated, it was so enfeebled that it could scarcely
qualify at this point as an 'overriding' or 'super-eminent' principle." (footnote omitted)).
78. See Summers, supra note 51, at 215 ("In sum, the Code's definitions
restrictively distort the doctrine of good faith.... If an obligation of good faith is to do
its job, it must be open-ended rather than sealed off in a definition. Courts should be
left free, under the aegis of a statutory green light, to deal with any and all significant
forms of contractual bad faith, familiar and unfamiliar.").
79. See id. at 205-06 ("Even if it were conceded that conduct must be subjectively
immoral before it can constitute bad faith, it still would not follow that dishonesty is
the only form of contractual bad faith. Thus when a man openly and straightforwardly
gives another a 'raw deal,' he does not necessarily act dishonestly. That is, he does not
undertake to mislead or deceive.... Such conduct is not dishonest. But it may well be
thought immoral, and it is certainly commercial bad faith. In truth, good faith cannot
be defined in terms of honesty." (footnote omitted)).
HeinOnline  -- 1998 BYU L. Rev. 1062 1998
1035] ACCELERATION PROVISIONS & GOOD FAITH 1063
Farnsworth, Summers and others in section 205, which provided
that "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.""0
Section 205 revived the historical conception of a duty of
good faith performance that encompassed external objective
standards of reasonable behavior."' Rather than attempt to de-
fine the term "good faith" positively, however, Section 205 left to
the judiciary the task of identifying conduct that breached the
reasonable expectations of a contracting party:
The phrase "good faith" is used in a variety of contexts, and its
meaning varies somewhat with the context. Good faith perfor-
mance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to
an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of
conduct characterized as involving "bad faith" because they
violate community standards of decency, fairness or reason-
ableness.82
Moreover, the comments strongly articulated the view that fair
dealing required not only honesty but also reasonableness in the
enforcement of contractual claims:
80. CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 205 (emphasis added).
81. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Listening to Law Professors Talk About Good Faith:
Some Afterthoughts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1253, 1253 (1995) ("[Ihe concept of good faith was
smuggled into the Commercial Code by Karl Llewellyn, who had found it in Germany.
Having succeeded in putting good faith into the [UCC], Llewellyn promptly covered up
the traces of the concept's Teutonic origin. Untainted by residues of foreign soil, it
sprouted roots and grew beyond the U.C.C.'s confines. In his capacity as Reporter for
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Professor Farnsworth found a larger field of
cultivation for this transplant." (footnotes omitted)).
82. CoNTRAcTs RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 205 cmt. a. The absence of a
positive definition of good faith clearly reflects the influence of Professor Summers' work
arguing that good faith is properly understood as an "excluder," that is, as a way to
describe conduct thought to be undertaken in bad faith. See generally Summers, supra
note 51.
Likewise, comment d to section 205 reinforced the idea that a court should evaluate
a party's good faith performance based upon an objective standard:
[Flair dealing may require more than honesty. A complete catalogue of types
of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are among those which have
been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack
of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse
of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in
the other party's performance.
CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 205 cmt. d.
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The obligation [of good faith] is violated by dishonest conduct
such as conjuring up a pretended dispute, asserting an inter-
pretation contrary to one's own understanding, or falsification
of facts. It also extends to dealing which is candid but unfair,
such as taking advantage of the necessitous circumstances of
the other party to extort a modification of a contract for the
sale of goods without legitimate commercial reason.... Other
types of violation have been recognized in judicial decisions:
harassing demands for assurances of performance, rejection of
performance for unstated reasons, willful failure to mitigate
damages, and abuse of a power to determine compliance or to
terminate the contract. 3
E. The Post-Section 205 Era
Section 205 rejected the purely subjective view of good faith
performance articulated in UCC Article 1, in favor of a broader
conception of good faith performance that is consistent with its
origins-including the notion that good faith does not permit a
party to abuse rights bestowed upon it by a contract so as to
defeat the reasonable expectations of the other contracting
party. Despite this change, section 205 appears not to have en-
countered widespread opposition at the time of its consideration
or promulgation.' Indeed, section 205's implicit criticism of the
83. CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 205 cmt. e.
84. When this provision was initially discussed and tentatively approved at the
May 1970 meeting of the American Law Institute, Professor Braucher (the Reporter at
the time) felt obliged to defend the definition of "good faith" against criticism that it
was an "attempt . . . to write the Sermon on the Mount into the Restatement of
Contracts." Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 814 (1982) (quoting 47 A.L.I. PROC. 489
(1970). Evidently worried about criticism that the broad standard would invite judicial
activism, Braucher was "amazed" when his presentation produced no comment from the
floor. Id. at 815.
As discussed infra in note 85 and accompanying text, Articles 3, 4, and 4A were
revised in 1990 to broaden the definition of good faith within those articles to include
"the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." Although this
objective standard does not appear to have generated the significant objections it did
in the 1950s, it was not without controversy. At least six states-Alabama, Idaho,
Louisiana, Missouri, Tennessee, and Utah--either refused to adopt the broader
definition or subsequently removed the objective component of that definition. See ALA.
CODE § 7-3-103(a)(4) (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 28-3-103(1)(d) (1995); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 10:3-103(a) (West 1998) (altogether omitting any definition of good faith in
Article 3, thereby incorporating the purely subjective definition from Article 1); MO.
REV. STAT. 400.3-103(a)(4) (Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-3-103(a) (1996)
(altogether omitting any definition of good faith in Article 3, thereby incorporating the
purely subjective definition from Article 1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-103(1)(d) (1997).
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more limited UCC duty of good faith appears to have had the
effect ultimately desired by its adherents; as the UCC revision
process has progressed during the 1980s, the revisers consis-
tently have broadened the UCC's statutory good faith definition
throughout the other Articles. Revisions of Articles 3, 4, and 4A
incorporated an "objective reasonableness" standard of good
faith in 1990; revision of Article 8 in 1995 accomplished the
same.
8 5
Nevertheless, after section 205's promulgation, some critics
expressed concern that section 205 described the duty of good
faith between contracting parties in rhetorical terms that were
too general and invited too much judicial intervention. Many of
these critics argued that the scope of the duty of good faith could
be defended normatively only by notions of economic efficiency;
several expressed concern that unless its parameters were prop-
erly restrained, a broad duty of good faith performance would
invite unwarranted judicial activism that would result in uncer-
tainty, litigation, and undesirable costs for contracting parties. 6
Indeed, in the years following the promulgation of section 205,
litigation arose in a wide variety of contexts involving claims of
85. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1990) ("'Good faith' means honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."); U.C.C. § 4-104(c)
(1990) (incorporating Article 3s definition of good faith into Article 4); U.C.C. § 4A-
105(a)(6) (1990) (using identical definition as in Article 3); U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(10) (1995)
("'Good faith,' for purposes of the obligation of good faith in the performance or
enforcement of contracts or duties within [Article 8], means honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.").
86. Most of these critics articulated a view of the good faith performance
requirement informed by efficiency concerns. For example, Professor Clayton Gillette
worried that
[a]n expansive definition of good faith, however, may also serve as a
source of uncertainty if it permits judicial modification of legal rules relied on
in the parties' contractual arrangements. The costs of entering into a
transaction are reduced to the extent that the parties are certain of the
consequences of contract terms and can predict who will bear specific risks.
Existence of a broad principle, judicially applied and not capable of disclaimer
by bargaining, introduces an element of uncertainty that is likely to increase
risks and raise costs at the contract formation stage.
Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619,
651. Likewise, Professor Steven Burton argued that "[traditional legal analysis supplies
no tools for balancing the relative capacities of the parties to protect themselves" by
securing more explicit contractual promises, and thus the duty of good faith had to be
informed by economic analysis and its role in "enhanc[ing] economic efficiency by
reducing the costs of contracting." Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the
Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 392-93 (1980)
(footnote omitted).
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bad faith: disputes involving the interpretation of sales con-
tracts, landlord-tenant disputes, lender liability disputes, and
numerous others.87 Perhaps more alarmingly for defendants,
plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their rights in these cases cre-
atively framed their causes of action and sought remedies (such
as punitive damages) typically unavailable in contract disputes.
Neither Contracts Restatement section 205 nor UCC section 1-
203 specify a precise remedy when one party breaches its duty of
good faith performance; instead, the drafters of those respective
provisions argued that the appropriate remedy should vary with
the context of the dispute. 8 In the face of this silence, aggrieved
parties sought relief based not only upon breach of contract, but
also breach of fiduciary duty, duress, and (borrowing from cases
recognizing causes of action against insurers who acted in bad
faith in dealing with their insureds) the "independent" tort of
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.8 "
Concerned that judicial decisions recognizing bad faith per-
formance as a "tort" were beyond the bounds intended by section
1-203, the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC [hereinafter
PEBI promulgated new commentary designed to clarify the con-
sequences of bad faith in the performance or enforcement of
contracts. In PEB Commentary No. 10. the PEB rejected the tort
of "commercial bad faith":
This section does not support an independent cause of action
for failure to perform or enforce in good faith. Rather, this
section means that a failure to perform or enforce, in good
faith, a specific duty or obligation under the contract, consti-
tutes a breach of that contract or makes unavailable, under the
particular circumstances, a remedial right or power. This dis-
tinction makes it clear that the doctrine of good faith merely
directs a court towards interpreting contracts within the com-
mercial context in which they are created, performed, and
enforced, and does not create a separate duty of fairness and
reasonableness which can be independently breached."0
87. See, e.g., Pacific First Bank v. New Morgan Park Corp., 876 P.2d 761 (Or.
1994) (discussing bad faith in context of lease agreements).
88. See CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 205 cmt. a ("The appropriate
remedy for a breach of the duty of good faith also varies with the circumstances.").
89. Many of these decisions are noted in Patricia A. Milon, Recent Development,
Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Loose Cannons of Liability for
Financial Institutions?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1197 (1987) and Anderson, supra note 33.
90. PEB COMMENTARY No. 10 (Feb. 10, 1994); see U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. (1995).
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Although PEB Commentary No. 10 articulates a limited view
of the scope of the aggrieved party's remedy for contractual bad
faith performance, its real significance lies in the sweeping lan-
guage it uses to describe the proper understanding of the UCC
duty of good faith enforcement. It is worth noting that PEB
Commentary No. 10 arose in response to concerns about the
unwarranted increase of litigation involving claims of "bad
faith." The PEB might have responded to this litigation boomlet
by articulating freedom-of-contract rhetoric; instead, the PEB
did precisely the opposite, describing the UCC duty of good faith
in broad terms, thus reflecting the full evolution of a duty of
good faith performance defined by external standards of behav-
ior:
The concept of Agreement permeates the entirety of the
Code.... The "agreement of the parties" cannot be read off the
face of a document, but must be discerned against the back-
ground of actual commercial practice. Not only does the Code
recognize "the reasonable practices and standards of the com-
mercial community ... [as] an appropriate source of legal obli-
gation," but it also rejects the "premise that the language used
[by the parties] has the meaning attributable to [it] by rules of
construction existing in the law rather than the meaning
which arises out of the commercial context in which it was
used." The correct perspective on the meaning of good faith
performance and enforcement is the Agreement of the parties.
The critical question is, "Has 'X' acted in good faith with re-
spect to the performance or enforcement of some right or duty
under the terms of the Agreement?" It is therefore wrong to
conclude that as long as the agreement allows a party to do
something, it is under all terms and conditions permissible.
Such a conclusion overlooks completely the distinction be-
tween merely performing or enforcing a right or duty under an
agreement on the one hand and, on the other hand, doing so in
a way that recognizes that the agreement should be inter-
preted in a manner consistent with the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties in the light of the commercial conditions
existing in the context under scrutiny. The latter is the correct
approach.9
91. Id. (emphasis added) (some alterations in original) (quoting Amy H. Kastely,
Stock Equipment for the Bargain in Fact: Trade Usage, "Express Terms," and
Consistency Under Section 1-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 777,
780 (1986) and U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. I(b) (1995)).
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PEB Commentary No. 10 is significant for several reasons.
First, it reflects the UCC's near-total rejection of the purely
subjective understanding of good faith as "honesty in fact." With
the July 1998 promulgation of the revised Article 9-which also
incorporates the commercial reasonableness standard--the
UCC now consistently defines the term "good faith" in a fashion
that evaluates a party's performance and enforcement by refer-
ence not only to honesty but also to reasonable commercial stan-
dards of good faith and fair dealing. Second, and more signifi-
cantly, PEB Commentary No. 10 disclaims the Easterbrook ab-
solute freedom-of-contract view of "good faith," overtly rejecting
the notion that a court can always evaluate a party's good faith
performance or enforcement by reference only to the four corners
of a written agreement.93 Instead, PEB Commentary No. 10
plainly compels courts to interpret agreements in a fashion that
respects the reasonable unexpressed expectations of a contract-
ing party.
IV. THE RHETORIC OF GOOD FAITH IN THE COURTS-OF GOOD
INTENTIONS AND (SOMETIES) QUESTIONABLE DECISIONS
As articulated in Contracts Restatement section 205 and PEB
Commentary No. 10, the duty of good faith compels a court to
inquire into whether a creditor's decision to accelerate based
upon the occurrence of an objective default comports with the
reasonable expectations of the borrower at the time that the
parties entered into the security agreement. As a result, a court
faced with a challenge to a creditor's acceleration decision must
inquire whether a reasonable borrower would have appreciated,
at the time she executed the loan documents, the likelihood that
the lender would decide to accelerate the loan under the circum-
stances that have now transpired. If the answer to that inquiry
is "yes," then the creditor's decision cannot come as an unfair
surprise to the borrower,9 and a court should sustain the credi-
92. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(43) (1998) ("'Good faith' means honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.").
93. See DENNIS M. PATTERSoN, GoOD FAIH AND LENDER LIABILrrI 35 (1989)
("Limiting the 'agreement of the parties' to the written words alone cramps the
contextual character of the [UCC] concept of Agreement. Meaning is wider than words
alone.").
94. In his book on good faith in the lender liability context, Professor Dennis
Patterson properly recognized the contextual nature of this inquiry:
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tor's acceleration as good faith enforcement of the security
agreement.
Such a sweeping conception of good faith obviously vests
significant trust in the ability of judges to appreciate the context
of the transaction at issue in a consistent fashion and to ascer-
tain correctly any unexpressed yet reasonable expectations of
the contracting parties. As is always true when the law leaves it
to judges to make decisions using such a malleable standard,
sometimes this trust is misplaced. In some cases, courts fail to
ascertain correctly the reasonable unexpressed expectations of
the contracting parties because of a philosophical perspective
that simply denies the possibility that a party's unexpressed
expectations could be reasonable.95 In other cases, courts push
the standard beyond its proper limits, ascribing "bad faith" to
enforcement decisions that doubtless could have been expected
by a reasonable borrower. In order to highlight the tensions
present when courts attempt to identify the "reasonable" expec-
tations of lenders and borrowers, Part IV of this Article dis-
cusses several notable decisions interpreting the UCC duty of
good faith-first evaluating the extent to which courts have used
the concept of impairment of security to inform this inquiry,"
and then the extent to which the courts have used (or misused)
Good faith means lack of surprise, an equation consistent with the
traditional contract law notion that the reasonable expectations of the parties
is the fundamental interest to be protected by the courts. To accomplish
this, . . . the law must reflect the commercial reality that businesspersons
frequently employ express terms in their agreements which, when read
against the commercial background against which the parties enter into their
agreements, do not mean what they say; further, the expectations of the
parties, which are expressed in their language, cannot be understood except
by reference to that background out of which those expectations are
forged....
Llewellyn's vision [of the concept of "agreement" as expressed in the UCCI
is very much like the hermeneutic circle. To understand the Agreement of the
parties one must look at their language. To understand the language one
must investigate the commercial background of its use. The expectations of
the parties are created both by their language and the circumstances
surrounding formation. To understand any single element requires an
understanding of the totality.
Id. at 33-35 (footnotes omitted).
95. Judge Easterbrook's rhetoric in Eham & Nate's Shoes appears to fall into this
category, as it denies the relevance of good faith altogether when a particular
enforcement decision is authorized by the literal terms of a written instrument. See
supra note 25 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 98-141 and accompanying text.
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the duty of good faith as a shield against pretextual actions by
creditors.
A. Good Faith and Security Impairment
1. The AVEMCO case and its progeny
Although Mortgages Restatement section 8.1 generally
adopts the view that security impairment is not necessary when
a creditor seeks to accelerate the maturity of a debt based upon
an objective default, a significant number of decisions have
adopted a view that makes the absence of security impairment
relevant to the court's evaluation of the creditor's good faith.
Perhaps the most notorious decision adopting this view is the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Brown v. AVEMCO Investment Corpo-
ration.9" In September 1972, Robert Herriford executed a prom-
issory note payable to AVEMCO Investment Corp., secured by a
lien upon Herriford's airplane. The security agreement permit-
ted AVEMCO to accelerate the debt if the plane was sold,
leased, or encumbered without AVEMCO's prior written con-
sent.9 In July 1973, Herriford entered a lease/purchase agree-
ment with three other parties (the "Buyers"), under which each
of the Buyers agreed to pay hourly rentals for use of the plane
and to contribute one-fourth of the amount necessary to retire
the AVEMCO debt; in exchange, the Buyers received an option
to purchase a one-fourth interest in the plane for one dollar
upon satisfaction of the AVEMCO debt.'
For the next two years, the loan remained current. In July
1975, the Buyers opted to exercise their purchase option and
tendered payment to AVEMCO in satisfaction of what the Buy-
ers believed to be the correct balance of the debt. AVEMCO re-
fused this tender, indicating that the actual balance was higher;
further, AVEMCO accelerated the loan based upon Herriford's
97. See infra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
98. 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979).
99. See id. at 1369. The security agreement also contained a clause permitting
AVEMCO to accelerate the maturity of the note if it "deem[s] itself insecure." Id.
100. See id. The Buyers became co-insured parties along with Herriford on the
insurance covering the plane, and AVEMCO apparently received a copy of the policy
listing the Buyers as co-insureds. Based upon this fact, the court could have concluded
that since AVEMCO had knowledge of Herriford's breach of the security agreement in
1973, AVEMCO had waived its right to accelerate based upon this objective default by
waiting until July 1975 to accelerate the debt and repossess the plane. As discussed in
the text, however, the Ninth Circuit did not treat this as a waiver case.
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leasing the plane in violation of the security agreement.10' The
Buyers objected, notifying AVEMCO in writing that the ten-
dered funds were in escrow and were available to AVEMCO
upon presentation of the satisfied note and security agreement.
Shortly thereafter, AVEMCO repossessed the plane and eventu-
ally sold it in September 1975 for a total of $7,000-more than
the existing balance of the debt.102
The Buyers filed an action against AVEMCO in the United
States District Court for the District of Montana, alleging that
AVEMCO's acceleration of the debt and repossession of the
plane were wrongful, constituted a conversion of the Buyers'
interest in the plane, and breached AVEMCO's duty of good
faith under the UCC. The Buyers essentially advanced a "no
harm, no foul" argument, noting that the lease did not seriously
threaten AVEMCO's security in any meaningful respect;
Herriford and the Buyers had continued to pay the note on a
timely basis, the plane's value far exceeded the balance of the
debt, and the Buyers could not acquire ownership of the plane
without paying off AVEMCO in full. 3 The Buyers thus argued
that no reasonable lender in AVEMCO's position would have
accelerated the loan as a consequence of the lease, which consti-
tuted at best a technical default. Accordingly, the Buyers asked
the court to instruct the jury, consistent with UCC section 1-208,
that AVEMCO could accelerate the loan only if it believed in
good faith that the lease actually impaired AVEMCO's security
interest in the plane.10 4 The district court refused and instructed
the jury that AVEMCO's enforcement of the acceleration clause
was valid if the jury found even a "technical breach of a lease
without consent" in violation of the security agreement.'0 5 The
jury returned a verdict for AVEMCO, and the district court en-
tered judgment upon that verdict.
101. See id. According to the opinion, the discrepancy between the parties'
respective payoff amounts was a function of AVEMCO's claim that it was entitled to
reimbursement for sums advanced for insurance pursuant to the terms of the security
agreement.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1369-72.
104. See id. at 1371-72.
105. Id. at 1372-73, 1375-76.
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Applying Texas law," 6 the Ninth Circuit reversed the judg-
ment and remanded for a new trial. The Ninth Circuit acknowl-
edged several state court decisions holding that UCC section 1-
208-and its requirement that the creditor must in good faith
believe that its security is impaired when accelerating based
upon insecurity° 7-does not apply to acceleration based upon
objective defaults.'0 8 The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that
section 1-208 applies whenever a secured party exercises its
discretion to accelerate a secured debt, even in the event of an
objective default such as Herriford's lease to the Buyers:
According to its language, § 1.208 applies when a party in
interest may accelerate payment "at will" or "when he deems
himself insecure" or "in words of similar import." Here the
agreement provided that AVEMCO may, at its option, acceler-
ate payment when the debtor leases without consent or when
AVEMCO deems itself insecure or when various other contin-
gencies occur. The agreement does not require immediate,
automatic acceleration upon one of these events but further
ties acceleration to the option of AVEMCO. Section 1.208 ap-
plies the Code's good faith concept to such acceleration and
provides that the creditor has power to exercise the option
"only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment
or performance is impaired."" 9
The Ninth Circuit conceded that objective and subjective
defaults were different, noting that objective defaults (such as
Herriford's lease) are generally within the control of the debtor,
whereas a creditor's feelings of insecurity are not, leaving the
debtor more subject to the "whim and caprice" of the creditor."0
106. The parties had specified that Texas law would govern the interpretation of
the security agreement See id. at 1369. Under UCC section 1-105(1), parties are free
to include forum choice clauses in their contracts, and such clauses are enforceable so
long as the state chosen bears a "reasonable relationship" to the subject of the
transaction.
107. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
108. As discussed supra in notes 23 and 64 and accompanying text, the majority
of courts have interpreted section 1-208 in a fashion inconsistent with the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation in AVEMCO.
109. AVEMCO, 603 F.2d at 1378.
110. See id. at 1378-79; U.C.C. § 1-208 cmt. ("The increased use of acceleration
clauses . . .has led to some confusion in the cases as to the effect to be given to a
clause which seemingly grants the power of an acceleration at the whim and caprice
of one party. This Section is intended to make clear that ... [such an] option is to be
exercised only in the good faith belief that the prospect of payment or performance is
impaired.").
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Based upon this distinction, the Ninth Circuit conceded that one
might read section 1-208 to apply only to acceleration based
upon insecurity, because that type of acceleration was more
likely to subject the debtor to the "uncontrolled will of the credi-
tor.""' The Ninth Circuit rejected this view, however, noting
that the facts strongly suggested the possibility that AVEMCO
had accelerated "from an inequitable desire to take advantage of
a technical default.""2 Based upon their view that the UCC
drafters did not intend to leave debtors defenseless against such
creditor abuse, the Ninth Circuit concluded that section 1-208
governed all situations in which a secured creditor exercises its
discretion to accelerate the maturity of a secured debt:
While [the insecurity] clause may be the primary focus of
§ 1.208, this court does not believe it is the only focus. Abuse is
possible with "due-on-lease" acceleration as well. The "option"
to accelerate based on a lease, like the one based on feelings of
insecurity, could be used by AVEMCO as a sword for commer-
cial gain rather than as a shield against security impairment.
Section 1.208, growing from and incorporating equitable prin-
ciples, defines "good faith" in acceleration to provide protection
from such abuse.'
The Ninth Circuit thus reversed the district court and remanded
for a new trial addressing whether AVEMCO's decision was
reasonable under the circumstances.114
The AVEMCO decision is not unique as an example of a
court's willingness to undertake ex post review of the reason-
ableness of a creditor's acceleration decision. A significant num-
ber of decisions involving real or personal property collateral
have used the rhetoric of good faith to shield the borrower
against acceleration under circumstances that neither impaired
the lender's security nor threatened its prospects for repayment.
For example:
The Texas Court of Appeals nullified the acceleration of a
purchase money mortgage debt and enjoined the foreclosure
of that mortgage-even though the mortgagor had failed to
pay installments on a timely basis during a title dispute
111. AVEMCO, 603 F.2d at 1378-79.
112. Id. at 1379.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1380.
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with the seller/mortgagee-on the ground that the circum-
stances demonstrated no meaningful threat to the mort-
gagee's security or prospects for repayment." 5
A Florida bankruptcy court enjoined a national motel fran-
chisor from accelerating a $200 million credit line secured by
mortgages on various motel properties-despite the bor-
rower's failure to provide the mortgagee with audited finan-
cial statements as required in the loan agreement-because
the breach did not impair the mortgagee's security or its
prospects for repayment and because acceleration would
have placed the borrower in default on more than $220 mil-
lion of other loans."6
115. See Davis v. Pletcher, 727 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App. 1987). On July 1, 1977, Davis
purchased what he believed was at least 670 acres of land from the Pletchers, executing
a $210,000 promissory note and deed of trust. The Pletchers' deed expressly covenanted
title to at least 670 acres of land, but required Davis to provide the Pletchers with
certain notice within five years from the date of the deed to trigger any liability on this
covenant. See id. at 33. Near the end of this period, a dispute arose over the parcel's
acreage. On June 30, 1982, Davis' attorney sent a mailgrarn to the Pletchers, notifying
them of a shortage of 41 acres, but did not send a certified survey until July 5, 1982.
The Pletchers responded that the five-year period specified in the deed had passed
without a valid objection by Davis, that no adjustment in the price was due, and that
they expected Davis to make the regularly scheduled installment on August 1, 1982.
Davis did not pay this installment to the Pletchers; instead, Davis sued for a
declaration that the Pletchers had breached the deed covenant, and attempted to pay
the mortgage installment into the court. On August 31, 1982, the Pletchers accelerated
the maturity of the note and thereafter filed a counterclaim seeking to foreclose the
deed of trust. See id. at 31-32.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the Pletchers, holding (a) that Davis'
failure to provide the Pletchers with a certified survey prior to July 1, 1982, deprived
Davis of any recourse under the deed covenants and (b) that the Pletchers legally had
accelerated the maturity of the note based upon Davis' monetary default. The Texas
Court of Appeals reversed, however, concluding that Davis provided sufficient notice to
place the Pletchers in breach of the covenant. As the court recognized, Davis' remedy
for this breach was still independent of his obligation to make his mortgage payments.
Nevertheless, the court held that the acceleration of the debt was a nullity, relying
primarily upon the court's equitable power to protect Davis as mortgagor from the
Pletchers' unreasonable actions:
Davis' attempted tender to the court registry clearly showed an ability and
willingness to pay the annual installment payment upon determination of the
amount of set off, if any, he is entitled to take. We can see no threat to the
security of the debt which called for exercise of the option to accelerate. Nor
can we find anything indicating that the security for the debt was in any way
threatened.
Id. at 36. Perhaps not surprisingly, the court's opinion relies upon earlier Texas
decisions-Parker v. Mazur, 13 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App. 1928) and Bischoff v. Rearick,
232 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App. 1950)-that the Ninth Circuit also relied upon in its decision
interpreting Texas law in AVEMCO. See AVEMCO, 603 F.2d at 1376.
116. See In re Prime Motor Inns, Inc., 131 B.R. 233 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991). Prime
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The Utah Supreme Court applied UCC section 1-208 to rein-
state a mortgage note accelerated for default in payment,
because there was "little doubt" that the mortgagee would be
paid and the mortgagee had no good faith reason to believe
that its security was threatened. 117
Motor Inns (PMI) agreed to advance up to $200 million to Northeast Hotel Associates
and other affiliated entities (Borrowers), secured by mortgages on various motel
properties owned by Borrowers. The loan agreement required that Borrowers had to
provide PMI with financial statements on a timely basis each year, and permitted
acceleration in the event of default. In late 1990, the Borrowers defaulted when their
accountants filed for bankruptcy and ceased operating, preventing the Borrowers from
providing the necessary financial statements to PMI on a timely basis. When PMI
(operating under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection) threatened acceleration, the
Borrowers sought an injunction and the bankruptcy court granted that injunction, citing
AVEMCO for the proposition that acceleration would be inequitable under the
circumstances:
[Elquity precludes [PMI] from accelerating the loan. The breach which gave
rise to [PMrfs] right to accelerate did not impair [PMI's] security or ability to
recover on the loan. [PMIs] economic risk is not increased merely because
[Borrowers] are unable to provide audited financial statements timely. In
contrast, [Borrowers] may suffer extreme and irrevocable hardship because a
default under the Loan Agreement may trigger the acceleration of the
repayment of $222,840,000 to other lenders under other loan agreements. In
sum, acceleration of the loan in this case would be unjust in light of the harm
that would accrue to [Borrowers] and the fact that [their] default is merely
a technical one which does not put [PMI] at risk.
Id. at 236 (footnote omitted).
117. See Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976). In 1971, Lorna and
George Wanlass purchased a farm from Don and Catherine Williamson, who retained
a purchase money note and second mortgage to secure the $20,000 balance of the
purchase price. The Wanlasses made monthly payments under the note for two years,
though it appears that many of these payments were untimely. When the Williamsons
did not receive the Wanlass's July 1973 payment, the Williamsons accelerated the
maturity of the note. Mr. Wanlass then tendered a check for the July installment, along
with an explanation that the original payment had been lost in the mails. The
Williamsons refused this tender and sued to collect the accelerated balance. The trial
court entered a judgment in favor of the Williamsons, but the Supreme Court of Utah
reversed and reinstated the note. See id. at 1146, 1149.
The court should have decided the case on simple waiver or estoppel grounds; the
evidence indicated that the Williamsons had routinely accepted late payments and had
not communicated clearly to the Wanlasses that timely payment was expected in the
future. See id. at 1146-47. The court proceeded, however, to invoke UCC section 1-208
to justify its decision. Although the default was an objective monetary default, the court
held that section 1-208
seems to recognize that acceleration is a harsh remedy which should be
allowed only if there is some reasonable justification for doing so, such as a
good faith belief that the prospect of payment is impaired. There was no such
showing made in this case. From the fact that the plaintiffs had a second
mortgage on this extensive property, there can be little doubt that the note
would be paid, principal and interest.
Id. at 1149.
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Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit-faced with an opportunity
to limit or reject its earlier AVEMCO decision-instead reaf-
firmed the view that section 1-208 governs accelerations
pursuant to objective defaults and requires that such deci-
sions be supported by "objective business-related consider-
ations."11 8
2. Reflecting on the AVEMCO decision
Numerous courts and commentators have roundly criticized
the AVEMCO decision, and the decision merits most of that
criticism. The court's interpretation of section 1-208 as incorpo-
rating a duty of good faith informed by objective reasonableness
is questionable because, as discussed in Part III, there is a
strong textual argument that the then-existing duty of good
faith articulated in UCC Article 1 required only the creditor's
subjective belief that its security was threatened." 9 Further-
more, the foundation laid by the AVEMCO court as a basis for
this interpretation of section 1-208 is profoundly weak in several
important respects.
First, the Ninth Circuit placed an unjustified level of impor-
tance upon the fact that the acceleration was not automatic but
was instead at AVEMCO's option. This distinction is absurd.
118. United States v. Grayson, 879 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1989). The U.S. Department
of Commerce Economic Development Agency (EDA) loaned $2 million to Univox-
California, Inc. (Univox), guaranteed by Univox's president John L. Grayson and his
wife Dorothy. When Univox defaulted by failing to make any installment payments
after July 1985, EDA accelerated the maturity of the loan in February 1986, demanded
payment from the Graysons under their guaranty, and eventually filed suit against the
Graysons to enforce their guaranty obligations. The Graysons objected that the
responsible EDA official did not accelerate the loan based upon a good faith belief that
EDA's prospects of repayment were impaired, but instead accelerated the loan in order
to receive a bonus under the EDA's new incentive plan for collections officials. See id.
at 623. Accordingly, the Graysons argued that EDA's acceleration violated section 1-208.
The district court granted EDA's motion for summary judgment, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. Rather than rely upon the existence of the payment default, however,
the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its statement in AVEMCO that section 1-208 governs all
optional accelerations, even those based upon objective monetary defaults. See id. at 623
n.3 (citing AVEMCO, 603 F.2d at 1378-90). Evaluating the surrounding circumstances,
the court found that Univox had not cured its monetary defaults during an 11-month
period, and that Univox's own financial statements projected net losses of $3.5 million
for 1995. See id. at 623. As a result, the court concluded that EDA's decision to
accelerate "was supported by objective business-related considerations," rendering it
"irrelevant" that the EDA official may also have been motivated by the desire to collect
a performance bonus. Id. at 623 n.4.
119. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
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Essentially all acceleration decisions are optional in the sense
that the AVEMCO court uses that term; no prudent mortgage
lender specifies that acceleration is automatic upon default.
Certainly, the UCC drafters were capable of appreciating that
acceleration provisions in commercial documentation are nearly
universally exercisable at the creditor's option. 2 ' Had the draft-
ers originally intended that all accelerations be objectively rea-
sonable, they could have said so in language far more sweeping
than section 1-208, which specifies accelerations "at will" or
based upon "insecurity."
Second, the Ninth Circuit ignored obvious and less objection-
able alternative theories of relief. The facts suggested that
AVEMCO knew that the Buyers had acquired an interest in the
plane-the Buyers were listed as co-insureds with Herriford on
the insurance policy covering the plane, a fact known to
AVEMCO-and AVEMCO nonetheless accepted debt service
payments from the Buyers without objection for two years. As
such, the court easily might have ruled that AVEMCO had
waived its ability to declare a default based upon the lease,
thereby obviating any need to inquire into the reasonableness of
AVEMCO's decision.' 2 '
Finally, the AVEMCO decision makes for poor commercial
policy, subjecting the lender to the risk of after-the-fact liability
based upon expert testimony (or worse, the judge's own sense of
fairness) that a reasonable lender would not have accelerated
despite the occurrence of an objective default as defined in the
loan documents. To the extent that the AVEMCO standard in-
corporates impairment of security as a necessary condition of
the acceleration decision and requires that the decision be objec-
tively reasonable, AVEMCO implicitly places upon the lender a
duty of care in exercising its contract remedies that goes beyond
the notion of enforcing one's remedies in a fashion that is not
120. See MORTGAGES RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 8.1 cmt. a ("While such
automatic acceleration provisions may be effective, a mortgagee is well-advised to avoid
their use because they circumscribe the mortgagee's discretion in dealing with
mortgagor default and may have a variety of unintended consequences for both
parties.").
121. As discussed supra in note 18, there is no serious dissent from the position
articulated in section 8.1(d)(2) that the mortgagee's conduct or failure to act may result
in a waiver of the right to accelerate. In contrast, as this Article reflects, there is
significant disagreement as to the proper bounds of the obligation of good faith.
HeinOnline  -- 1998 BYU L. Rev. 1077 1998
1078 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
opportunistic and does not cause unfair surprise to the other
contracting party.
Nevertheless, although one can properly argue that the
Ninth Circuit reached the wrong conclusion, one cannot properly
criticize the decision for asking the wrong question. Indeed, the
evolving duty of good faith seems to compel the scope of the
Ninth Circuit's inquiry in AVEMCO. The court encountered a
situation in which a creditor invoked an acceleration clause that
on its face served a clearly legitimate protective purpose; the
circumstances, however, did not appear to present the threat of
harm that the provision was designed to protect against. The
evolving duty of good faith articulated in PEB Commentary No.
10 rejects the view that just because the written document per-
mits the creditor to act, the creditor's decision to act is thereby
permissible without further inquiry.'22 PEB Commentary No. 10
suggests that other factors are relevant to the inquiry: Would a
reasonable lender have acted similarly in similar circumstances?
Has this particular lender acted similarly with respect to other
borrowers in similar circumstances? To the extent that there
exists evidence suggesting that the answer to these questions is
"no," the evolving duty of good faith compels the court to inquire
whether acceleration in the absence of actual harm was within
the reasonable, yet unexpressed, expectations of the borrower.
As a result, decisions like AVEMCO cannot be terribly sur-
prising, for at the margin the rhetoric of good faith invites courts
to look to the nature of the underlying transaction in order to
inform the underlying expectations of the parties. In this regard,
the nature of the mortgage transaction-in which the mortgagee
receives an interest in property for the primary purpose of secur-
ing a debt-provides the context for identifying those underlying
expectations. As discussed below, in property law and in mort-
gages law, courts have consistently-although perhaps not al-
ways correctly-looked to the concept of security impairment as
a basis for identifying the parties' reasonable expectations.
a. The "due-on-sale" phenomenon. The rhetoric of good
faith influenced mortgage law most vividly in the battle over the
validity of "due-on-sale" and "due-on-encumbrance" clauses prior
to the federal preemption occasioned by the Garn-St. Germain
122. See PEB COMiENTARY No. 10, supra note 90.
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Act.'23 During the 1970s, mortgage lenders often refused to con-
sent to a proposed transfer by a mortgagor unless the mortgagor
and proposed transferee agreed to an upward adjustment of the
mortgage interest rate. Mortgagors objected to such conduct,
arguing that the due-on-sale clause served only to protect the
security of the mortgagee's interest in the property itself, i.e., as
security for the mortgagor's indebtedness. Mortgage lenders
argued that these decisions constituted a legitimate exercise of
the rights granted by a due-on-sale clause, as such decisions
allowed lenders to adjust their loan portfolios in line with pre-
vailing interest rates. In litigation, the courts typically framed
the question in terms of the parties' justified expectations:
Would acceleration based upon interest rate concerns, in the
absence of a threat to the lender's security, be consistent with
the mortgagor's unexpressed expectations? Or would accelera-
tion based upon interest rate concerns instead be a "hidden pur-
pose, not within the contemplation of the parties when they
signed the agreement?" 24
A number of state courts upheld attempts by mortgage lend-
ers to use due-on-sale clauses in this fashion, holding that if the
agreement prohibited sale without the lender's consent, there
was no inequity in conditioning the lender's consent upon the
mortgagor/transferee's agreement to pay a higher interest
rate. '2 A significant number of decisions refused to sanction
such conduct, however, and instead held that a lender's refusal
to consent to a transfer was unreasonable and unenforceable
(despite the technical violation of the mortgage agreement) if
the transfer posed no demonstrable threat to the mortgagee's
security or prospects for repayment. 2 6 The opinion of the Florida
123. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1994).
124. Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485, 488 (Ala. 1979) (Torbert, C.J., dissenting
from denial of application for rehearing).
125. See, e.g., Tierce, 382 So. 2d at 487-88; Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 509 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Colo. 1973); Baker v. Loves Park Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 333
N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Ill. 1975); Stith v. Hudson City Sav. Inst., 313 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808-10
(1970); Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan, 224 S.E.2d 580, 586-88 (N.C. 1976); Gunther
v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 531-32 (Tenn. 1973).
126. See, e.g., Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 578 P.2d 152, 156-58 (Ariz.
1978); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan, 481 S.W.2d 725, 728-31 (Ark. 1972);
Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 582 P.2d 970, 973-77 (Cal. 1978); Tucker v. Lassen Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 526 P.2d 1169, 1173-75 (Cal. 1974); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156, 158-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 250 N.W.2d 804, 807-09 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); Sanders v. Hicks,
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Court of Appeals in First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Lock-
wood 127 provides a classic example of a court using the rhetoric
of good faith to prevent what the court considered an "inequita-
ble" acceleration:
Florida courts recognize that a lender has the right to ac-
celerate a mortgage when the violation of the acceleration
provision goes to the impairment of the lender's security. They
require that the lender in a foreclosure action bear the burden
of demonstrating legitimate grounds for refusal to accept the
transferee. By so doing, our courts protect borrowers by pro-
viding them with equitable defenses to inequitable accelera-
tions by lenders. This approach is based on the historical pur-
pose of acceleration clauses, which is to protect the security of
lenders.
... [Tihe sole purpose set out by First Federal [in the
mortgage] deals with the protection of its security. There is no
mention anywhere in the mortgage instrument that rising
interest rates will subvert the stated intent and serve to justify
First Federal's attempt to gain a commercial advantage.128
Likewise, the California Supreme Court decision in Wellenkamp
v. Bank of America,29 which essentially triggered the eventual
adoption of the Garn-St. Germain Act, refused to permit the
blanket enforcement of due-on-sale clauses despite acknowledg-
ing that they could serve the lender's business purpose:
Although we recognize that lenders face increasing costs of
doing business and must pay increasing amounts to depositors
for the use of their funds in making long-term real estate loans
as a result of inflation and a competitive money market, we
believe that exercise of the due-on clause to protect against
this kind of business risk would not further the purpose for
which the due-on clause was legitimately designed, namely to
protect against impairment to the lender's security that is
shown to result from a transfer of title. Economic risks such as
those caused by an inflationary economy are among the gen-
317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975), overruled by First Nat'l Bank v. Caruthers, 443 So. 2d 861,
864 (1983); Fidelity Land Dev. Corp. v. Rieder & Sons Bldg. & Dev. Co., 377 A.2d 691,
694-95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter,
564 P.2d 1013, 1017-19 (Okla. 1977); Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Garrison, 553 P.2d 1090, 1091-92 (Wash. 1976).
127. 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
128. Id. at 159 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
129. 582 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1978).
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eral risks inherent in every lending transaction. They are nei-
ther unforeseeable nor unforeseen. Lenders who provide funds
for long-term real estate loans should and do, as a matter of
business necessity, take into account their projections of future
economic conditions when they initially determine the rate of
payment and the interest on these long term loans .... [lt
would be unjust to place the burden of the lender's mistaken
economic projections on property owners exercising their right
to freely alienate their property through the automatic en-
forcement of a due-on clause by the lender.13
Today, of course, the Garn-St. Germain Act preempts state
laws limiting the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses, and years
of commerce under the shadow of Garn-St. Germain has re-
shaped the parties' expectations regarding the use of objective
default clauses as a hedge against the higher costs of borrowing
as interest rates rise. Nevertheless, the history of how the due-
on-sale clause fared in state courts prior to Garn-St. Germain
reflects the strong tendency of judges to view enforcement of
mortgage remedies in a context informed by the nature of the
mortgage as a security device.
b. Casualty and partial condemnation. Mortgage law has
also seen the rhetoric of good faith influence the disputes over
the proper disposition of a monetary award for the partial con-
demnation of the mortgaged premises or the insurance proceeds
from an insured casualty to the mortgaged premises. Following
a casualty or partial condemnation, the mortgagee may wish to
apply the condemnation award or insurance proceeds toward
satisfaction of the underlying debt; in contrast, the mortgagor
may insist upon use of those monies to rebuild or restore the
premises. 131 Courts have split as to the proper resolution of such
disputes. A significant number of decisions have upheld the
mortgagee's right to apply such funds against the mortgage
debt, regardless of the circumstances. 32 Another significant
130. Id. at 976 (footnotes omitted).
131. Following a total condemnation, of course, restoration of the mortgaged
premises is impossible, and all authorities generally recognize the mortgagee's right to
apply the award against the mortgage debt. See, e.g., Morgan v. Willman, 1 S.W.2d 193,
198-200 (Mo. 1927); 1 Nelson & Whitman, supra note 17, § 4.12, at 175.
132. With regard to condemnation, see, e.g., In re Wolf, 77 B.R. 51, 56 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1987); City of Chicago v. Salinger, 52 N.E.2d 184, 188 (IlM. 1943); In re Forman, 240
N.Y.S. 718, 719-20 (Sup. Ct. 1930); 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, § 4.12, at
175-76.
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body of decisions, however, has placed equitable limitations
upon the mortgagee's dominion and control over such funds. In
the condemnation context, numerous cases permit the mort-
gagee to collect the award from a partial taking only to the ex-
tent that the mortgagee can demonstrate that the taking has
impaired its security;133 the Mortgages Restatement adopts this
view absent an effective waiver by the mortgagor. 134 In the casu-
With regard to casualty insurance, see, for example, First Nat1 Bank v. Martin, 7
N.E.2d 637, 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937); Giberson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 329
N.W.2d 9, 11-13 (Iowa 1983); General G.M.C. Sales, Inc. v. Passarella, 481 A.2d 307,
312 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); Savarese v. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co., 182 N.E. 665,
667-68 (N.Y. 1932); Montgomery v. First Nat'l Bank, 508 P.2d 428, 434-35 (Or. 1973);
English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522-23 (Tex. 1983); 1 NELSON & WHrrMA N, supra
note 17, § 4.15, at 186 & n.2.
133. See, e.g., Swanson v. United States, 156 F.2d 442, 450 (9th Cir. 1946); People
ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Redwood Baseline, Ltd., 149 Cal. Rptr. 11, 16-17 (Ct. App.
1978); Harwell v. Georgia Power Co., 298 S.E.2d 498, 498 (Ga. 1983); First W. Fin.
Corp. v. Vegas Continental, 692 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Nev. 1984); State ex rel. Comm'r of
Transp. v. Kastner, 433 A.2d 448, 449 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981); Buell Realty
Note Collection Trust v. Central Oak Inv. Co., 483 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. App. 1972).
Courts have also disagreed over the question whether the mortgagor may waive the
protections of this rule. Compare Pima County v. INA/Oldfather 4.7 Acres Trust #2292,
700 P.2d 877, 879-80 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding contractual allocation of award
to mortgagee), with Sessler v. Arshak Corp., 464 So. 2d 612, 612-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (limiting mortgagee recovery to extent of security impairment, notwithstanding
contractual provisions allocating award to mortgagee), and First W. Fin. Corp. v. Vegas
Continental, 692 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Nev. 1984) (same).
134. Section 4.7(b) provides in pertinent part:
Unless the mortgage effectively provides the contrary, if restoration of the
loss or damage . . . is reasonably feasible within the remaining term of the
mortgage with the funds received by the mortgagee, together with any
additional funds made available by the mortgagor, and if after restoration the
real estate's value will equal or exceed its value at the time the mortgage was
made, the mortgagee holds the funds received subject to a duty to apply
them, at the mortgagor's request and upon reasonable conditions, toward
restoration.
MORTGAGES RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.7(b). The comments to section 4.7
demonstrate significant ambivalence regarding whether the mortgagor's waiver of this
right should be enforceable, and clearly open the door for a court to take into account
the rhetoric of good faith in interpreting the parties' underlying expectations:
It is common to find mortgage clauses that purport to give the mortgagee
the right to casualty insurance and eminent domain awards without
mentioning any corresponding duty to permit use of the funds for restoration
of the premises, or that expressly negate any such duty. While such a
provision may be construed to preclude the mortgagoer's right to use of the
fimds for restoration under Subsection (b), it may also be disregarded by the
courts. For example, in jurisdictions following the Restatement, Second, of
Contracts the provision might be considered unenforceable on the ground
that... enforcement would violate the mortgagee's duty of good faith and fair
dealing.
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alty insurance context, there is likewise modern support for the
view that the mortgagee must make insurance proceeds avail-
able for restoration if restoration is practical and will not impair
the mortgagee's security; 135 the Mortgages Restatement also
adopts this view. 13 ' The most notable such decision, the Califor-
nia decision in Schoolcraft v. Ross,137 strongly incorporates the
rhetoric of good faith:
"In every contract there is an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything
which injures the right of the other to receive the benefits of
the agreement."...
[Tihe purpose of a deed of trust is that the borrower will
have the use of funds loaned on specific terms and the lender
will have the right to a specified repayment that is secured by
the deed of trust. The lender does not have the right to unilat-
erally cut off the borrower's right to use the loaned funds un-
less he can show that his security is impaired.
Here there is no evidence that the security was impaired
by the fire nor is there any evidence that plaintiffs were un-
willing or unable to continue making payments on the prop-
erty. 1
38
c. Transfer of tenant's leasehold interest. Outside the con-
text of mortgage law, property law has struggled to resolve a
comparable issue in the landlord-tenant context: Under what
circumstances may the landlord exercise its contractual right to
withhold consent to a tenant's transfer of the leasehold? When
market rental rates boomed in certain areas in the 1980s, land-
lords often withheld consent to a proposed assignment or sub-
Id. cmt. e (citation omitted).
135. See, e.g., Schoolcraft v. Ross, 146 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59-60 (Ct. App. 1978);
Cottman Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 182 A. 551, 554-55 (Md. 1936) (personal property
collateral); Miller v. Van Kampen, 397 N.W.2d 253, 254-25 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
(installment land contract); Starkman v. Sigmond, 446 A.2d 1249, 1253-56 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1982); 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 17, § 4.15, at 186-88.
136. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
137. 146 Cal. Rptr. 57 (Ct. App. 1978).
138. Schoolcraft, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 59-60 (quoting Brown v. Superior Ct., 212 P.2d
878, 881 (Ca. 1949)) (citations omitted). The court's reasoning is all the more striking
in light of the evidence, which suggested that the mortgagee's conduct was motivated
by the fact that she was "old and sick and needed the money immediately to take care
of her medical needs." Id. at 60.
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lease unless the tenant and transferee agreed to pay a higher
rent. This practice resulted in a series of cases addressing
whether the landlord could in good faith withhold consent solely
to obtain a higher rental, i.e., when the proposed transfer did
not threaten the security of the landlord's interest or the land-
lord's prospects for payment of the original stated rent. Tradi-
tionally, of course, the landlord could enforce a no-transfer re-
striction contained in a lease and thereby refuse consent to
transfer for any reason, or for no reason at all-consistent with
the notion that the landlord's freedom of conveyancing gave the
landlord an absolute right to select her tenants. 139 Recently,
however, some courts have refused to permit a landlord to with-
hold consent to a proposed transfer solely to capture the bonus
value present in the lease, absent a freely-negotiated absolute
right to withhold consent. 4 ° In these opinions, the rhetoric of
good faith often plays a significant role, as is evident in the Cali-
fornia decision in Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc.:
"[Tihere has been an increased recognition of and emphasis on
the duty of good faith and fair dealing inherent in every con-
tract." Thus, "[iun every contract there is an implied covenant
that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect
of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive
the fruits of the contract. . . ." "[W]here a contract confers on
one party a discretionary power affecting the rights of the
other, a duty is imposed to exercise that discretion in good
139. See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. Bank v. Key Mkts., Inc., 559 N.E.2d 600, 602-04 (Ind.
1990); Jacobs v. Klawans, 169 A.2d 677-79 (Md. 1961), overruled by Julian v.
Christopher, 575 A.2d 735 (Md. 1990); Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 78
N.W.2d 377, 379-82 (Minn. 1956); Abrahamson v. Brett, 21 P.2d 229, 232 (Or. 1933);
Reynolds v. McCullough, 739 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Tex. App. 1987); B & R Oil Co. v. Ray's
Mobile Homes, Inc., 422 A.2d 1267, 1267-68 (Vt. 1980).
140. See, e.g., Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035, 1037-38 (Ala.
1977); Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205, 211 (Alaska 1980); Tucson Med. Ctr. v.
Zoslow, 712 P.2d 459, 461 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Warmack v. Merchants Natl Bank, 612
S.W.2d 733, 735 (Ark. 1981); Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 843-49
(Cal. 1985); Basnett v. Vista Village Mobile Home Park, 699 P.2d 1343, 1346-47 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 731 P.2d 700 (Colo. 1987); 1010 Potomac Assocs.
v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 208-10 (D.C. 1984); Fernandez v. Vazquez,
397 So. 2d 1171, 1173-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Funk v. Funk, 633 P.2d 586, 588-
89 (Idaho 1981); Jack Frost Sales, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 433 N.E.2d 941,
949 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735, 736-39 (Md. 1990);
Newman v. Hinky Dinky Omaha-Lincoln, Inc. 427 N.W.2d 50, 53-55 (Neb. 1988);
Ringwood Assocs., Ltd. v. Jack's of Route 23, Inc., 379 A.2d 508, 512 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1977); Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 638 P.2d 1084, 1085-86 (N.M. 1982);
Ernst Home Center, Inc. v. Sato, 910 P.2d 486, 492-94 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
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faith and in accordance with fair dealing." Here the lessor
retains the discretionary power to approve or disapprove an
assignee proposed by the other party to the contract; this dis-
cretionary power should therefore be exercised in accordance
with commercially reasonable standards....
... [It is not] reasonable to deny consent "in order that the
landlord may charge a higher rent than originally contracted
for." This is because the lessor's desire for a better bargain
than contracted for has nothing to do with the permissible
purposes of the [no-transfer clausel-to protect the lessor's
interest in the preservation of the property and the perfor-
mance of the lease covenants. "'The clause is for the protection
of the landlord in its ownership and operation of the particular
property-not for its general economic protection.'"141
B. Good Faith as a Shield Against Pretextual Conduct
In AVEMCO, the Ninth Circuit articulated the concern that
a creditor might use its discretion to accelerate a debt as a
"sword for commercial gain rather than a shield against security
impairment."42 The Ninth Circuit determined that this concern
justified scrutiny of the reasonableness of all acceleration deci-
sions. More appropriately, most courts have not pushed the duty
of good faith so far and instead would permit an inquiry into the
objective reasonableness of an acceleration decision only when
there is evidence that the creditor's decision was pretextual and
opportunistic in nature. Although this view of good faith doubt-
less comports more closely with the view articulated in PEB
Commentary No. 10 than the AVEMCO view, it does not assure
that the court will not make mistakes in evaluating the underly-
ing facts of any given dispute.
The potential for well-intended, yet misguided, decisions is
demonstrated by the recent decision of the Mississippi Supreme
Court in Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Cermack,'4 a decision
driven in significant part by the court's confusion over the
141. Kendall, 709 P.2d at 844-45 (quoting Cohen v. Ratinoff, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Ct.
App. 1983); California Lettuce Growers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Co., 289 P.2d 785 (Cal.
1955); Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 128 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1942);
Schweiso v. Williams, 198 Cal. Rprt. 238 (Ct. App. 1984); Ringwood Assocs., 379 A.2d
at 512).
142. Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1379 (9th Cir. 1979).
143. 658 So. 2d 1352 (Miss. 1995).
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proper relationship between UCC sections 1-203 and 1-208."'
Container Engineering Corp. and its president, Jerry Cermack,
had maintained a borrowing relationship with Peoples Bank &
Trust Company since 1973. In 1987, Cermack sought additional
financing for Container in an attempt to obtain a new account.
The bank agreed to restructure the existing debt of Cermack
and Container, and to advance an additional $25,000 in credit;
in conjunction with this restructuring, Container agreed not to
incur additional debt without the prior consent of the bank.'45
On March 31, 1988, Container purchased two new trucks on
credit without obtaining the bank's prior approval. The bank
discovered Container's purchase in July 1988; rather than de-
claring an immediate default, however, the bank opted to wait
and see whether the purchase would negatively affect Con-
tainer's cash flow. After reviewing the next quarter's financial
reports, the bank determined that Container's cash flow position
had deteriorated. The bank thus accelerated the maturity of the
outstanding debts to Container and Cermack and demanded
repayment of the $176,543.54 balance. When Cermack was un-
able to obtain financing from the SBA or other banks, Cermack
entered into a lease/purchase arrangement for its business facil-
ity in order to generate the funds necessary to retire the bank's
debt.146
Shortly thereafter, Cermack and Container filed suit against
the bank alleging (among other claims) that the bank had
breached its duty of good faith in accelerating the maturity of
the debt. Cermack argued that the bank's acceleration violated
the bank's duty of good faith under UCC section 1-208, as there
was no reasonable basis to question the security of the bank's
position or the ability of Cermack and Container to repay the
debt. The trial court instructed the jury that the bank's decision
to accelerate had to be objectively reasonable under section 1-
208, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Cermack and
Container. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, however, re-
versed, holding that
[Section 1-208] is inapplicable to situations where a creditor,
under the terms of its contract with the debtor, has accelerated
144. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
145. See Cernack, 658 So. 2d at 1355.
146. See id. at 1356.
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its debtor's outstanding obligations after the occurrence of an
event that was in the complete control of the debtor, i.e., where
the creditor accelerates indebtedness because the debtor fails
to comply with the terms and conditions contained in the
promissory note, deed of trust or loan agreement.14
As Cermack had breached the loan agreement by incurring the
debt to purchase the trucks-an objective default within his
control-the court's rationale would seem to foreclose any possi-
bility that section 1-208 would require the court to evaluate the
objective reasonableness of the bank's action.' 4 However, the
court left the door open for such an evaluation based upon the
bank's delay in accelerating the loan:
Peoples Bank did not immediately accelerate Cermack's in-
debtedness upon learning of Cermack's breach of the loan
agreement. Instead, Peoples Bank waited approximately two
months after learning of Cermack's breach before accelerating
Cermack's outstanding indebtedness. Therefore, it could be
argued that this delay.., indicated that Peoples Bank acceler-
ated the outstanding debt not because of the breach, but be-
cause Peoples Bank deemed itself "insecure."149
The court held that if the bank did accelerate Cermack's indebt-
edness based upon insecurity and not due to the incurrence of
additional debt, then section 1-208 would govern the bank's de-
cision to accelerate the debt and Cermack could demonstrate
that the bank's decision was objectively unreasonable.' 50 Thus,
because the bank's delay permitted an inference of pretext, the
court remanded the case for further proceedings.
Like the Mississippi court in Cermack, other courts have
used the rhetoric of good faith to sustain challenges to accelera-
tion decisions ostensibly based upon objective defaults when the
borrower has presented evidence that suggested the possibility
of pretextual action by the creditor. For example, a Massachu-
setts bankruptcy court awarded damages against Bank of Bos-
147. Id. at 1358 (citation omitted).
148. Furthermore, as discussed supra in notes 62-76 and accompanying text, there
is a strong textual argument that section 1-208 merely restates the general good faith
duty contained in section 1-203, such that the Banks good faith in accelerating would
be determined based upon its subjective belief that its security was threatened-not the
reasonableness of that belief.
149. Cermack, 658 So. 2d at 1358.
150. See id.
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ton-Western Massachusetts for wrongfully accelerating an in-
stallment note for nonpayment of interest, on the ground that
the bank could have covered the installments using funds from
the borrower's operating account but chose instead to accelerate
because it had discovered that one of the borrower's sharehold-
ers had ties to organized crime.' Likewise, the Fifth Circuit
reversed summary judgment in favor of the FDIC as successor to
RepublicBank Spring Branch, which had accelerated the matu-
rity of a $250,000 line of credit due to borrower's failure to pro-
vide financial statements as required by the security agreement,
on the ground that the record permitted an inference that the
Bank's insistence upon the financial statement was
pretextual. 52
151. See In re Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc., 87 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988),
rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 97 B.R. 721 (D. Mass. 1989). Martin Specialty Vehicles
(MSV) was a small business engaged in van conversion. The Bank floorplanned its
vehicles pursuant to a promissory note that was facially payable on demand, but the
parties had orally agreed that MSV would pay the note via installments. While
negotiating with the Bank for a $50,000 credit line unconnected with the purchase and
sale of vehicles, MSV did not pay installments of interest under the floorplan note; at
all times, however, MSV had sufficient funds on deposit with the Bank to cover these
installments. Without prior notice to MSV, the Bank padlocked MSV's plant, accelerated
the floorplan note and demanded its full repayment, allegedly on account of the
arrearage in interest payments. See id. at 759. MSV never reopened its doors; the Bank
repossessed and sold all of MSV's tangible assets.
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, MSV sued the Bank alleging, inter alia, conversion
of its property (based on the absence of an actionable default) and estoppel. MSV
argued that it was not in material default under the floorplan agreement, because the
Bank had the right to withdraw funds from MSV's operating account to satisfy the
interest installments in question, because the operating account had contained sufficient
funds to cover the interest arrearage, and because the Bank had charged MSV's account
for installments on the floorplan note in the past. See id. at 760, 763. MSV argued that
the Bank's action was in bad faith because the arrearage was a pretext for its real
concern-that one of MSVs shareholders, Felix Tranghese, was known by reputation
as a member of organized crime in the Springfield, Massachusetts area. Indeed, the
evidence showed that during discussions with MSV following the padlocking, the Bank
informed MSV that "in order for the company to reopen, it must make up all arrearages
on loans and take Tranghese's name off any loan" and that "Tranghese's interest as a
stockholder would have to be terminated." Id. at 760. The court held that the Bank's
acceleration breached the Banls duty of good faith in enforcing the provisions of its
security agreement. The court concluded that the Bank had acted dishonestly and thus
in subjective bad faith; the court also characterized the Bank's decision to accelerate
the floorplan note and foreclose upon MSV's assets as "irrational0" and "unfair" and
thus in objective bad faith, regardless of the Bank's honesty or motives. Id at 767. This
latter conclusion appears to have been based upon the court's view that "the one
month's arrearage in interest . ..would not be a material breach giving right to
acceleration, in view of the fact that the Bank had the right to withdraw the funds
from MSVs account." Id. at 763.
152. See Texas Refrigeration Supply, Inc. v. FDIC, 953 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1992).
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In terms of commercial policy, the Cermack result is simply
abysmal. The court's decision to treat the creditor's delay as
evidence of creditor pretext is plainly counterintuitive and pro-
vides precisely the wrong incentives to lenders faced with poten-
tial problem loans. As compared to the two-year delay in
AVEMCO-a gap which legitimately suggests the possibility of
pretext by the lender-the two-month delay in Cermack seems
more readily explained as the action of a prudent lender that
wanted to avoid precipitous and possibly unwarranted collection
efforts. Institutional lenders typically have formal or informal
policies that "build in" some short delay prior to the institution
of formal recovery proceedings. These policies doubtless reflect
Texas Refrigeration Supply (TRS) maintained this line of credit from the Bank, secured
by the inventory of TRS. The note evidencing this line of credit required TRS to provide
the Bank with a monthly financial statement, but TRS failed to provide these financial
statements (allegedly because of a computer problem). The Bank accelerated the
maturity of the note, and when TRS failed to make immediate payment, repossessed
and sold the inventory for $20,000 (despite the collateral's fair market value of at least
$200,000). See id. at 978, 981-82. TRS then sued the Bank for breach of contract,
wrongful acceleration, and breach of the duty of good faith.
Trial occurred after FDIC had succeeded to the Bank's position under the loan
documents, and the district court granted summary judgment for FDIC on the ground
that TRS's affirmative claims and contract defenses were barred by the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine. The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that "[obligations about timely
acceleration and the disposal of collateral are implicit in every promissory note," are not
"secret" or "unwritten" obligations, and thus could be enforced against the FDI0 as
successor to the Bank. Id. at 981. The court then remanded the case for a
determination regarding whether the Bank accelerated the maturity of the note and
whether it did so in bad faith. Noting that good faith is "betrayed by '[clircumstances
which tend to show that the holder has exercised his option to accelerate, not for
purposes of preserving his debt or preserving the security therefor, but for the purpose
of coercing the maker to pay the then balance remaining unpaid on the note,'" id.
(quoting Davis v. Pletcher, 727 S.W.2d 29, 35-36 (Tex. App. 1987)), the court held that
the Bank's conduct was susceptible of two interpretations:
The condition of the $250,000 loan that required the debtor to give the
bank monthly financial statements is clearly intended to allow the bank to
monitor the borrower's financial well-being.... Two possible implications flow
from the record before us. First, it could be that the bank decided to demand
the financial statement . . . because of legitimate misgivings about the
financial state of TRS. On the other hand, the trier of fact could also infer
that the bank knew that the default was simply due to a temporary technical
problem, but was nevertheless requiring strict compliance to create an excuse
to accelerate.
Id at 982. Although the Fifth Circuit's rhetoric of good faith is not as sweeping as that
of the Ninth Circuit in AVEMCO, the opinion uses enough language of
"reasonableness"-such as the suggestion that the bank's misgivings about its debtor's
financial state should be "legitimate-that the opinion seems to leave the door open
for the trial court to conclude, on remand, that the existence of a technical default does
not by itself reasonably or rationally justify acceleration of the debt.
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what in many cases is prudent business practice; such a delay
enables the lender to evaluate the situation, make a carefully
considered judgment about the borrower's prospects, and
thereby avoid precipitous decisions. The costs associated with
formal recovery and bankruptcy proceedings are significant
enough that lenders have a built-in incentive to take the time
necessary to attempt to work with their borrowers to avoid these
costs. This circumspection appears to explain the conduct of
Peoples Bank in Cermack; rather than declare a default immedi-
ately upon learning about the new debt, the bank instead waited
to see whether the new debt in fact would have a deleterious
effect upon Container's cash flow. As a policy matter, commer-
cial law should encourage that sort of circumspection, 53 but the
court's reasoning in Cermack provides precisely the opposite
incentive. To the extent that Cermack permits the borrower to
recast the creditor's circumspection as a de facto waiver of an
objective default, it encourages creditors to act immediately and
without reflection-a result that often leads to bad decisions and
the costs that flow from them.
Again, however, it is important to separate the scope of the
court's inquiry in Cermack from the court's ultimate conclusion.
Although one can criticize the merits of the Cermack court's
153. See, for example, the approach of the Ohio Court of Appeals in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Triskett Illinois, Inc., 646 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
Triskett owned a commercial office park subject to a $5.4 million nonrecourse mortgage
held by Metropolitan. When Triskett encountered significant erosion in its tenant base,
Triskett was unable to service the debt and fell into default on its mortgage note
installments in August 1990. Over the ensuing six months, Triskett made several
workout proposals to Metropolitan, including one plan for "net cash flow" payments
until Triskett could restore its tenant base and another to list the property, for sale.
Metropolitan insisted, repeatedly and in writing, that it would only consider modifying
the loan once Triskett brought the loan current by making the past due installments.
After nearly seven months, when Triskett had not brought the loan current,
Metropolitan accelerated the balance of the debt and instituted foreclosure proceedings.
Triskett counterclaimed that Metropolitan failed to enforce its mortgage agreement in
good faith. The trial court entered summary judgment for Metropolitan, and the Ohio
Court of Appeals affirmed. The court rejected Triskett's argument that Metropolitan
acted in bad faith in obtaining the ex parte appointment of a receiver, noting that "the
decision of a lender in an arm's-length commercial transaction to enforce its contractual
rights does not constitute an act of bad faith." Id. at 534. Further, the court rejected
Triskett's complaint about Metropolitan's delay in its enforcement, noting that
"Triskett's contention that Metlife breached its implied duty of good faith by engaging
in protracted negotiations which misled Triskett into anticipating a workout is obviated
by the correspondence between the parties, which reflects Metlife's insistence, from the
outset, that Triskett either bring the loan current or face legal action." Id.
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conclusion to treat a two-month delay as evidence of pretext, the
nature of the court's inquiry was both appropriate and consis-
tent with the conception of good faith expressed in PEB Com-
mentary No. 10. If a creditor's action is in fact pretextual or op-
portunistic, that action may not comport with the reasonable
unexpressed expectations of the borrower and thus could violate
the duty of good faith performance expressed in Contracts Re-
statement section 205 and UCC section 1-203.
V. "RATIONALITY" AND THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY-SERVITUDES: A DIFFERENT PARADIGM?
The debris left in the wake of the academic and judicial de-
bates about the proper scope of good faith provokes the question
of whether mortgage law should search for a different stan-
dard-one without the baggage attendant to the term "good
faith"--to constrain the mortgage lender's right to accelerate the
mortgage debt. In this regard, it is useful to note that property
law has faced a similar question (i.e., how to measure the "rea-
sonableness" of contract enforcement) in the law governing the
enforcement of restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes.
Courts faced with challenges to servitude enforcement have
articulated the tension in familiar terms. Should an equitable
servitude be enforced against a successor landowner if it is rea-
sonable on its face, without the need to demonstrate actual
harm? Or must enforcement of a servitude be reasonable under
the circumstances, i.e., must the challenged use threaten the
holder of the servitude with the harm against which the servi-
tude was designed to protect her? The law of equitable servi-
tudes provides a useful contrast, because although courts have
struggled with the proper resolution of this tension, they have
often done so without using the duty of good faith as an explicit
basis for informing their analysis. Accordingly, the law of equi-
table servitudes, especially as reflected in the new Restatement
(Third) of Property-Servitudes,54 provides by analogy an alter-
native standard for the limitation upon a mortgagee's power to
accelerate the maturity of a debt.
The vast majority of covenants and servitudes are of the
"objective" variety (e.g., "the land may be used only for a single-
family residence" or "any house must contain at least 3,000
154. See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
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square feet of living area"), such that the holder need not exer-
cise discretion in determining whether the covenant was vio-
lated.'55 One could analogize such covenants to the typical objec-
tive default covenant in the modern mortgage or security agree-
ment, and for each covenant, the same interpretive question
arises regarding its enforcement. Can an objective use restric-
tion be enforced according to its terms without regard to the
existence of actual harm, or should the absence of harm prevent
enforcement of that restriction? The positions underlying these
respective views are demonstrated in Nahrstedt v. Lakeside
Village Condominium Ass'n. 15
A. Factual Background
In January 1988, Natore Nahrstedt purchased and occupied
a unit in the Lakeside Village Condominiums in Culver City,
California. The recorded covenants, conditions and restrictions
(CCRs) for Lakeside Village provided that "[no animals (which
shall mean dogs and cats), livestock, reptiles or poultry shall be
kept in any unit except that usual and ordinary domestic fish
and birds . . . may be kept as household pets within any
unit. .. ."'7 Notwithstanding the CCRs, Nahrstedt owned and
kept three cats in her unit. Shortly after Nahrstedt moved in,
the Lakeside Village Condominium Association (Association)
learned about her cats,l"' demanded that she remove them, and
fined her for violating the CCRs. 5 9 Nahrstedt sued the Associa-
tion seeking a declaration that the pet restriction was unreason-
able and thus unenforceable against her under California Civil
155. In comparison, some covenants are "subjective" covenants that require the
exercise of discretion by the party charged with enforcement (e.g., a covenant requiring
that any house's architecture must be consistent with the surrounding neighborhood).
Where, for example, an architectural review covenant provides vague standards for its
enforcement (or no standards at all), courts have implied a duty to act in good faith in
approving plans, and have refused to enforce decisions that were arbitrary or capricious.
See, e.g., Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 449 P.2d 361, 363 (Colo. 1969); ROBERT G.
NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS § 4.7, at 154 (1989).
156. 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 299 (Ct. App. 1992) [hereinafter Nahrstedt I, vacated and
rev'd, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994) [hereinafter Nahrstedt I1].
157. Nahrstedt I, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 301.
158. Ms. Nahrstedt alleged that agents of the Association discovered the cats by
peering through her windows and entering her unit without permission.
159. See Nahrstedt II, 878 P.2d at 1278. The Association initially assessed to
Nahrstedt a fine of $25/month, which progressively increased to $500/month when
Nahrstedt continually refused to remove the cats. See Nahrstedt 1, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
301-02.
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Code section 1354, on the ground that her cats posed no threat
to the peace, quiet, and safety of her neighbors. 60 The Associa-
tion demurred, arguing that the pet restriction was reasonable
and enforceable as a matter of law because it furthered the col-
lective well-being of residents within the development. The trial
court sustained the Association's demurrer and dismissed
Nahrstedt's complaint.
161
B. Nahrstedt I and the "Reasonable as Applied" Standard
A majority of the California Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's judgment of dismissal and ordered the trial court to
vacate its order sustaining the Association's demurrer
(Nahrstedt I). Ignoring decisions in other states upholding con-
dominium regulations that limited residents' ability to maintain
pets,6 2 the majority in Nahrstedt I rejected the Association's
defense that the pet restriction was facially reasonable and thus
enforceable under section 1354. The majority, clearly troubled
by a per se ban on pets regardless of harm, determined that
existing California precedent permitted enforcement of cove-
nants under section 1354 only where enforcement of those cove-
nants was reasonable under the particular circumstances.6 3
In particular, the majority felt constrained by two previous
decisions, Bernardo Villas Management Corp. Number Two v.
Black'64 and Portola Hills Community Ass'n v. James.65 In
Bernardo Villas, apartment managers sued a resident to enforce
a recorded restriction that prevented residents from parking
trucks, except for temporary loading or unloading. The manag-
ers had fined the resident in question over $2,000 for violating
160. See Nahrstedt II, 878 P.2d at 1278-79. In pertinent part, section 1354
provides: "The covenants and restrictions in the declaration shall be enforceable
equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable, and shall inure to the benefit of and bind all
owners of separate interests in the development." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354(a) (West Supp.
1998) (emphasis added).
161. See Nahrstedt II, 878 P.2d at 1279.
162. See Wilshire Condo. Ass'n v. Kohlbrand, 368 So. 2d 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (upholding regulation that prevented condominium residents from replacing pets
who died); Dulaney Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O Brey, 418 A.2d 1233 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1980) (upholding restriction that permitted only one pet).
163. See Nahrstedt I, 11 Cal Rptr. 2d at 306-37.
164. 235 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App. 1987), overruled by Nahrstedt II, 878 P.2d at
1289.
165. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1992), overruled by Nahrstedt II, 878 P.2d at
1289.
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this restriction by parking his new pickup truck-which he used
only for personal transportation-in his assigned carport space.
The court refused to permit the managers to recover the unpaid
fines, concluding that the restriction violated section 1354 as
applied to "clean noncommercial pickup trucks" and that "the
parking of such vehicles in condominium carports was not aes-
thetically unpleasant to reasonable persons and did not inter-
fere with other owners' use and enjoyment of their property."166
In Portola Hills, the dispute involved an attempt by the commu-
nity association to enforce a recorded per se restriction on satel-
lite dishes against a resident who had installed a dish in his
backyard. The trial court dismissed the community association's
complaint, and the court of appeals affirmed, noting that
[the satellite] dish is not visible to other residents or the pub-
lic. With that established, the question becomes whether the
ban against a satellite dish that cannot be seen promotes any
legitimate goal of the association. It clearly does not. Accord-
ingly, the restriction is unreasonable as a matter of law.16
Based upon these precedents, the majority in Nahrstedt I
concluded that section 1354 permitted enforcement of covenants
only if the covenants were reasonable as applied to the specific
factual circumstances presented by a dispute. 6 ' The court thus
concluded that Nahrstedt's complaint could not be deemed insuf-
ficient as a matter of law, because it alleged that the cats did not
disturb her neighbors... and because the record contained no
findings of fact suggesting that her cats posed any threat or
166. Bernardo Villas, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
167. Portola Hills, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 583.
168. See Nahrstedt I, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 307. The Nahrstedt I court stated:
The question of whether the pet restriction at issue in the case before us
is an enforceable equitable servitude ... is a mixed issue of law and fact
which can only be resolved in the context of the particular circumstances of
this case. In Portola Hills and Bernardo Villas, the courts did not address the
question of law (i.e., the reasonableness of the restrictions being challenged),
until the question of fact (the circumstances of the particular homeowners
who were challenging the restrictions) was determined.
Id. (citations omitted).
169. Nahrstedt's complaint alleged that her cats "are not a nuisance, are clean, are
kept inside her unit and have not been the object of complaints by any of her close
neighbors." Id. at 302.
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disturbance. 170 The court thus returned the case to the trial
court for an evidentiary hearing.
C. Nahrstedt II and the "Reasonable on Its Face" Standard
In a six to one decision, the California Supreme Court re-
versed and reinstated the dismissal of Nahrstedt's complaint
(Nahrstedt II). Expressly disapproving of Bernardo Villas and
Portola Hills, the Nahrstedt II court adopted a "facially reason-
able" standard for the enforcement of covenants. The majority
argued that section 1354's proviso that a covenant is "enforce-
able ... unless unreasonable" meant that a recorded use restric-
tion was clothed with a presumption of reasonableness that
rendered it enforceable unless the person challenging it proves it
to be unreasonable. 17' To inform the statutorily undefined term
"unreasonable," the majority looked to background principles of
the law of equitable servitudes. Noting the contractual nature of
private land use restrictions, the majority suggested that
"[w]hen landowners express the intention to limit land use, 'that
intention should be carried out.""i 72 Based upon this strong
"freedom-of-contract" view, the court thus concluded that "when
enforcing equitable servitudes, courts are generally disinclined
to question the wisdom of agreed-to restrictions" 7 ' and should
freely enforce such a restriction unless it violates public policy
(such as restrictive covenants based upon race, ethnicity, sex,
religion or disability);174 is arbitrary (meaning that it "bear[s] no
rational relationship to the protection, preservation, operation
or purpose of the affected land"&5 ); or imposes burdens on the
affected land that are disproportionate to the restriction's bene-
ficial effects.
76
170. "[T]he enforceability of the pet restriction will be decided in the trial court
after the taking of evidence as to the relevant circumstances of this case." Id. at 307.
In contrast, the dissenting judge would have sustained the demurrer, because "[tihe
courts should leave the enforcement of covenants and restrictions to the homeowners
associations unless there are constitutional principles at stake, enforcement is arbitrary,
or the association fails to follow its own procedures." Id. at 312 (Hinz, J., dissenting).
171. Nahrstedt II, 878 P.2d 1275, 1286 (Cal. 1994) (quoting CAL. Civ. CODE § 1354,
subd. (a) (West Supp. 1998)).




176. See id. at 1287.
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According to the majority in Nahrstedt II, these principles
compelled the conclusion that courts must give significant defer-
ence to the judgment of homeowners associations in enforcing
and administering servitude regimes, in order to achieve "the
stability and predictability so essential to the success of a shared
ownership housing development."' The majority feared that if
homeowners associations had to justify enforcement of recorded
restrictions on a case-by-case basis, a variety of adverse conse-
quences would follow: nonenforcement would frustrate the
bargained-and-paid-for expectations of unit purchasers;1 8 asso-
ciations might refuse to enforce covenants for fear of litigation
challenging the enforcement decision;179developers might be
discouraged from developing affordable housing alternatives
such as condominiums; 80 unit purchasers might bear costly
increases in legal fees to enable associations to defend their
enforcement decisions;' 8' and nonenforcement might disrupt
177. Id.
178.
[Gyiving deference to use restrictions contained in a condominium project's
originating documents protects the general expectations of condominium
owners 'that restrictions in place at the time they purchase their units will
be enforceable.'... [This] also protects buyers who have paid a premium for
condominium units in reliance on a particular restrictive scheme.
Id. at 1284 (quoting Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 647, 653 (1981)).
179.
[The presumption of validity] provides substantial assurance to prospective
condominium purchasers that they may rely with confidence on the promises
embodied in the project's recorded CC & R's.... When courts treat recorded
use restrictions as presumptively valid, and place on the challenger the
burden of proving the restriction 'unreasonable' under the deferential
standards applicable to equitable servitudes, associations can proceed to
enforce reasonable restrictive covenants without fear that their actions will
embroil them in costly and prolonged legal proceedings.
Id. at 1288.
180. "[Giving deference to use restrictions contained in a condominium project's
originating documents . . . encourages the development of shared ownership
housing--generally a less costly alternative to single-dwelling ownership-by attracting
buyers who prefer a stable, planned environment." Id. at 1284.
181. See id. at 1288. The Nahrstedt II court states that:
When courts accord a presumption of validity to ... recorded use restrictions
and measure them against deferential standards of equitable servitude law,
it discourages lawsuits by owners of individual units seeking personal
exemptions from the restrictions. This ... protects all owners in the planned
development from unanticipated increases in association fees to fund the
defense of legal challenges to recorded restrictions.
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harmony between neighbors within the common interest devel-
opment. 182 Accordingly, the majority concluded that covenants
should be freely enforced as long as those covenants were fa-
cially reasonable, without the need for proof of actual harm.'83
Evaluating the challenged pet restriction on its face, the
Nahrstedt II majority concluded as a matter of law that the re-
striction "is not arbitrary, but is rationally related to health,
sanitation and noise concerns legitimately held by residents of a
high-density condominium project."18
D. Synthesizing the Debate: The Restatement (Third) of
Property: Servitudes.
For the past decade, the American Law Institute has at-
tempted to modernize and restate the law governing equitable
servitudes. The product of this effort, the proposed Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes [hereinafter Servitudes Restate-
ment] directly addresses the proper resolution of the "on its face
or as applied" dilemma manifested in the Nahrstedt litigation.
The Servitudes Restatement draws the traditional distinction
between direct restraints on alienation (e.g., a covenant forbid-
ding the sale of a unit without the association's consent) and
indirect restraints on alienation (e.g., the pet restriction in
Nahrstedt). The Servitudes Restatement concludes that a direct
restraint is enforceable only if it is reasonable as applied to the
specific circumstances of the dispute, i.e., only if the "utility of
the restraint [outweighs] the injurious consequences of enforcing
the restraint."1" The comments justify the adoption of this stan-
182. See id. at 1288-89. The Nahrstedt II court states that:
[Case-by-case enforcement] would impose great strain on the social fabric of
the common interest development. It would frustrate owners who had
purchased their units in reliance on the CC & R's. It would put the owners
and the homeowners association in the difficult and divisive position of
deciding whether particular CC & R's should be applied to a particular
owner. . . . Homeowners' associations are ill-equipped to make such
investigations, and any decision they might make in a particular case could
be divisive or subject to claims of partiality.
Id.
183. "Under the holding we adopt today, the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of a condominium use restriction ... is to be determined not by reference to facts that
are specific to the objecting homeowner, but by reference to the common interest
development as a whole." Id. at 1290.
184. Id.
185. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITTUDES § 3.4 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
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dard by reference to the same "commercial reasonableness"
standard (informed by the rhetoric of good faith) that courts
have applied to govern a landlord's discretion to withhold con-
sent to a tenant's proposed assignment or subletting."6 By in-
voking the rationale of Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc. and its
progeny, 8 7 the Servitudes Restatement thus requires evaluation
of direct restraints on a case-by-case basis, giving due consider-
ation to the individual consequences that would flow from en-
forcing the restriction.'
In contrast, the Servitudes Restatement requires a much less
demanding standard of review for indirect restraints on alien-
ation such as the pet restriction in Nahrstedt. Section 3.5 pro-
vides:
A servitude is not invalid because it indirectly restrains
alienation by limiting the use that can be made of property, by
reducing the amount realizable by the owner on sale or other
transfer of the property, or by otherwise reducing the value of
the property, unless there is no rational justification for the
servitude.8 9
The Servitudes Restatement thus contemplates only facial review
of objective covenants such as the pet restriction in Nahrstedt,
1991) (hereinafter SERVITUDES RESTATEMENT).
186. The SERVITUDES RESTATEMENT explains:
Traditionally, the interests of a landlord were regarded as strong enough
to justify absolute prohibitions on transfer of the tenant's interest without
consent of the landlord, and the landlord was permitted to withhold consent
arbitrarily. Modem law restricts the landlord's power, regarding the restraint
on alienation as unjustified unless the landlord can withhold consent only for
reasons related to protection of the landlord's rent and reversionary interests,
at least in the absence of an explicit agreement that the landlord can
withhold consent for other reasons. To the extent that the landlord-tenant
rule was applied to [common interest ownership], the same evolution in the
consent rule should take place.
Id. § 3.4 cmt. d.
187. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
188. This is not to suggest, however, that section 3.4 would require an ad hoc,
case-by-case evaluation of enforcement of all conceivable forms of direct restraints. For
example, the comments to section 3.4 clearly suggest that certain rights of first
refusal-for example, a restraint that granted the association a preemptive right to
purchase a unit from its owner by matching any binding offer received by that
owner-are reasonable under section 3.4's balancing test, unless exercised for an
illegitimate purpose (e.g., for racially exclusionary reasons). See SERVITUDES
RESTATEMENT, supra note 185, § 3.4 cmt. f.
189. Id. § 3.5 (emphasis added).
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the truck ban in Bernardo Villas, or the satellite dish prohibi-
tion in Portola Hills.9 ' As the Reporter's Note explains, this
decision reflected a deliberate choice designed to promote cer-
tainty and predictability in administering servitude regimes:
[Section 3.5's "rationality" standard] reflects the approach of
this Restatement, which is to give effect to the intentions of
the parties unless there is a substantial reason to disregard
them. In the realm of direct restraints on alienation, the re-
straints clearly interfere with operation of the free market
economy, and the reasonableness test has been elaborated
through many cases. However, in the realm of arrangements
challenged as indirect restraints on alienation, it is much less
clear that [they] interfere with free functioning of the market
in land. It is more likely that a mushy "reasonableness" stan-
dard will interfere with the market by introducing a substan-
tial element of doubt into the process of forming transactions.
The "lacking in rational justification" standard provides sub-
stantially more guidance to parties in negotiating the financial
terms of land sales, while protecting land resources from irra-
tionally created servitudes. 9'
In evaluating objective covenants, then, the Servitudes Restate-
ment embraces a "rationality" standard or facial reasonableness
standard comparable to the one articulated in Nahrstedt I1-a
standard that involves no judicial inquiry into whether the spe-
cific breach of the covenant has produced actual harm.
E. Comparing the Two Restatements-The Rhetoric of
"Rationality" and Section 8.1
The "reasonable on its face/reasonable under the circum-
stances" debate in servitude enforcement mirrors the debate in
judicial decisions reviewing the enforcement of mortgage accel-
eration clauses. As a result, the "rationality" or "facial reason-
ableness" standard of the Servitudes Restatement provides a
potential alternative standard for enforcement of mortgage ac-
celeration clauses, or perhaps a means for informing the proper
interpretation of the "bad faith" constraint upon the creditor's
enforcement authority under Mortgages Restatement section 8.1.
190. The reporters' note to section 3.5 explicitly rejects the rationale of Bernardo
Villas by name. See id. § 3.5, reporter's note.
191. Id.
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As noted above, the Servitudes Restatement exalts efficiency
concerns to justify its "rationality" standard for the review of
objective covenants. These same efficiency concerns also moti-
vated section 8.1; the comments emphasize the need to promote
predictability in mortgage remedies and to avoid "difficult and
time-consuming judicial inquiries into such matters as the de-
gree of mortgagor's negligence, the relative hardship that accel-
eration imposes, and other subjective concerns." 92
The application of a rationality standard would have dra-
matic consequences for the analysis of mortgage acceleration
decisions in marginal cases. Under a rationality standard, the
circumstances surrounding the acceleration decision and the
consequences that acceleration might impose upon the borrower
become totally irrelevant. The rational basis for an objective
default provision (i.e., the potential harm that a particular de-
fault could impose on the mortgagee) and the benefits of cer-
tainty and predictability achieved by across-the-board enforce-
ment are deemed to outweigh harms that individual borrowers
might suffer as a consequence of decisions that may in reality be
imprudent or inconsistent with the reasonable yet unexpressed
expectations of the borrower.'93 A rationality standard would
thus dictate enforcement of acceleration decisions in essentially
all cases; any common objective default provision appearing in
standard mortgage documentation easily passes rational-basis
scrutiny. Consider, for example, the Bank's decision to call in
Randolph's credit line in the hypotheticals in Part I. Randolph
could hardly characterize the requirement to provide financial
statements as irrational; his failure to provide such statements
could leave the Bank with insufficient information to make in-
formed judgments about the enforcement of its rights under the
loan documents. Under the rationality standard, Randolph's
failure to provide the statements in a timely fashion would cer-
tainly justify Bank's decision in Example One (Randolph is in-
192. MORTGAGES RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 8.1 cmt. e.
193. Indeed, the Gan-St. Germain Act's preemption of state law limiting the
enforceability of due-on-sale clauses, see 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1994), reflects this
philosophy precisely. In Congress's judgment, the "rationality" of due-on-sale clauses
(i.e., the risk that a transfer might result in the impairment of the mortgagee's
security) and the benefits achieved by blanket enforcement (i.e., no litigation and the
enhanced solvency of financial institutions engaged in mortgage lending) were deemed
to outweigh the costs imposed upon individual borrowers who did not anticipate that
the clause would be enforced against them in the context of a "nonthreatening" transfer.
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solvent), Example Two (Bank mistakenly believes itself inse-
cure), Example Three (Bank seeks higher interest rate), and
Example Four (Bank changes its lending policy). Further,
Randolph's violation arguably would justify the Bank's decision
in Example Five (Bank officer accelerates based upon animus
toward Randolph), as under a rationality standard, there would
be no occasion or need for the court to evaluate the reasonable-
ness of the Bank's decision under the particular circum-
stances. 94 As a result, one might argue that a rationality stan-
dard would have captured more precisely section 8.1's stated
efficiency goals than the "bad faith" standard actually used in
section 8.1(d)(3). A rationality standard would carry the appeal
of certainty and predictability (i.e., no evaluation of Randolph's
financial condition or the adequacy of Bank's security), while
leaving commercial borrowers free to bargain for "reasonable"
constraints upon the lender's discretion (e.g., a provision requir-
ing that a decision to accelerate be based upon a reasonable
belief that the lender's security or prospects for repayment are
impaired).
VI. REFLECTING ON THE FUTURE IMPACT OF SECTION 8.1-SOME
CONCLUDING VIEWS
While the comments in each Restatement offer similar effi-
ciency rationales, the Restatement provisions themselves still
use differing terms--"rationality" versus "bad faith"-that have
traditionally carried quite different rhetorical force. Thus, while
the rationality standard of the Servitudes Restatement provides
an intriguing perspective on the enforcement of mortgage accel-
eration clauses, section 8.1(d)(3) of the Mortgages Restatement
still incorporates the term "bad faith" as one of the operative
194. The Servitudes Restatement does not provide specific examples or illustrations
as to how it would treat someone enforcing a concededly rational servitude for wholly
personal reasons. Suppose, for example, that Mrs. Nahrstedt's neighbors chose to
enforce the pet restrictions not because of concerns about her cats, but in order to
retaliate against her for her attempts to persuade condominium residents to vote in
opposition to the association's plans to renovate common facilities, or (even more
tangentially) because Mrs. Nahrstedt's son was arrested on suspicion of drug possession.
The rationality standard of section 3.5 seems to suggest that the court should enforce
the servitude, but it seems likely that given an egregious set of facts, a court likely
might place an overarching duty of good faith upon the enforcement of the servitude
and refuse to permit pretextual enforcement. Cf Building Monitoring Sys., Inc. v.
Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1995) (tenant may raise retaliatory eviction as affirmative
defense to landlord's summary action for possession of leased premises).
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constraint upon the enforcement of those clauses. As a result,
courts seeking to interpret section 8.1 will have to address the
appropriate scope of the evolving duty of good faith manifested
in Contracts Restatement section 205 and throughout the revised
UCC. As this Article has explained, the conception of good faith
expressed in those enactments dictates that courts cannot pay
perfunctory homage to the literal terms of a written document in
unthinking fashion. Instead, this broader conception of good
faith mandates that courts interpret written agreements "in a
manner consistent with the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties in the light of the commercial conditions existing in the
context under scrutiny."9 ' To the extent that this standard obli-
gates the court to identify the unexpressed reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties, how should we expect courts to articulate
those expectations in the context of a creditor's decision to accel-
erate a mortgage debt following an objective default?
One approach would be to conceptualize good faith in a nar-
row fashion that perhaps would come closest to the "rationality"
standard of the Servitudes Restatement. Under this view, a cred-
itor would be acting in good faith in accelerating a mortgage
debt for breach of an objective default as long as the creditor
makes that decision for any business-related reason. This view,
held by Professor Nelson (the principal drafter of section 8.1)196
assumes that the mortgagor and mortgagee have a shared un-
derstanding that objective default provisions rationally serve to
protect the mortgagee against all potential business risks that
the mortgagee believes it might face if it were to continue the
mortgagor-mortgagee relationship unchanged.
Returning to the introductory hypotheticals,'97 under this
approach the Bank lawfully could call in Randolph's line of
credit in Examples One through Four. In Example One, of
course, in which Randolph is insolvent, the Bank's decision is
defensible under any view of good faith. In Example Two, the
195. PEB CoMMENTARY No. 10, supra note 90; see also supra note 90 and
accompanying text.
196. Neither the comments nor the reporters' note expressly articulate this
formulation of the "bad faith" standard. In our numerous discussions on this subject,
however, Professor Nelson has articulated that he believes a creditor would act in good
faith if the creditor acted for any business justification, unless that stated business
justification violated existing federal or state law (e.g., antidiscrimination laws,
antitrust laws, unfair or deceptive trade practices statutes).
197. See supra Part I.
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Bank mistakenly (if negligently) believes that its prospect for
repayment is threatened; in Example Three, the Bank seeks a
higher interest rate than what prevailed at the time of the origi-
nal loan agreement; in Example Four, the Bank has made a
policy judgment to no longer seek or maintain lending relation-
ships with small borrowers. In each example, the Bank's motiva-
tion is business-related, as it seeks to promote the Bank's gen-
eral economic interest. Thus, each of those acceleration decisions
would withstand challenge under section 8.1. Under this view,
the Bank legally could not accelerate only in Example Five,
where the Bank officer acts out of animus toward Randolph.
This conduct would constitute bad faith enforcement by the
Bank, as the reasonable parties to the mortgage transaction
would not expect that the Bank would enforce that provision for
reasons completely unrelated to the Bank's business interests.
At the opposite extreme, one might conceptualize good faith
so broadly as to adopt a standard comparable to that of
AVEMCO, thereby permitting a creditor to accelerate only when
there exists a threat to the creditor's security or prospect of re-
payment.1 98 This view supposes that the mortgagor and mort-
gagee have a shared understanding that objective default provi-
sions serve to protect the mortgagee against the risk that the
mortgagor cannot repay the loan and that the mortgagee's secu-
rity may be insufficient to permit full satisfaction of the mort-
gage debt. Under this view, then, the mortgagor would expect
the mortgagee to exercise its remedies only when the mort-
gagee's security or prospects for payment are actually threat-
ened; absent that threat, the mortgagee's action to accelerate
the mortgage debt would constitute bad faith enforcement. Un-
der this conception of bad faith, the Bank could not lawfully call
in Randolph's line of credit in Examples Two through Five. In
Example Two, the Bank's belief in its insecurity is unfounded
(and perhaps negligent), and its prospects for repayment are not
threatened. In Example Three (Bank seeks higher interest rate)
and Example Four (Bank changes its lending policy), the Bank's
actions are motivated by business reasons completely unrelated
to Randolph's ability to pay and the value of the collateral rela-
tive to the mortgage debt. Likewise, in Example Five, the Bank's
198. See supra notes 98-118 and accompanying text.
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action arises from animus toward Randolph and his family, not
from concerns regarding the loan itself.
If those were the only two options, I would concur with Pro-
fessor Nelson that the "any-business-reason" standard is plainly
preferable. The AVEMCO conception of bad faith does not com-
port with the tenor of the comments to section 8.1, which reject
the notion that the mortgagee must show impairment of security
to enforce an acceleration based upon an objective event of de-
fault. The AVEMCO view would not produce the certainty and
predictability in mortgage remedies that section 8.1 seeks to
attain, as it would invite potential second-guessing of the
lender's business judgment. 99 Second, the AVEMCO standard
comes close to establishing a duty of care on the part of the
lender in making enforcement decisions, further blurring the
line between tort and contract. Third, and most significantly,
"good faith" is properly informed by the commercial context sur-
rounding the transaction in question, and AVEMCO simply fails
to take account of those contexts-such as the enforcement of
due-on-sale clauses-in which reasonable parties clearly under-
stand that the lender may accelerate regardless of security im-
pairment. 00
Upon reflection, however, I do not believe either of these two
views provides a satisfactory explanation for how section
8.1(d)(3) should serve to constrain a creditor's enforcement of its
remedies. To say that the "any-business-reason" standard is
better than AVEMCO is not to suggest that it is the correct stan-
dard. The "any-business-reason" standard of bad faith assumes
that the reasonable mortgagor and mortgagee understand when
they enter the mortgage transaction that any business reason
will permit the mortgagee to enforce any objective default pro-
vision-even if the reason and the default provision bear no
apparent or implicit relationship to each other. In other words,
the "any-business-reason" conception of bad faith appears to
require the assumption that in the commercial context, a mort-
199. Of particular concern is the likelihood that such litigation often would arise
in adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy courts, where the presence of a creditor's
deep pocket (and the potential recovery for unsecured creditors in a lender liability
action or an equitable subordination claim) might cause the bankruptcy judge to engage
in more critical or searching review of the creditor's decision than a court would have
given that same decision at the time it was made.
200. See supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.
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gagor can have no unexpressed, yet reasonable, expectations re-
garding the mortgagee's power to exercise its objective default
remedies.
On the margin, that assumption seems implausible. Suppose
(in another variant on the introductory hypothetical) that the
Bank threatens to call in Randolph's credit line, based upon a
six-day delay in providing financial statements, unless
Randolph agrees to buy out his brother-in-law (who does own a
20% stake in the business, but who makes no day-to-day man-
agement decisions and has no control over company funds), who
Smith and other bank officers believe has an alcohol problem. Is
it clear that a reasonable borrower in Randolph's position could
or should have anticipated that the Bank would attempt to call
in his loan, at a time when there was no apparent threat to the
Bank's security or its prospects for repayment, in order to influ-
ence the composition of the ownership of the business? I think
the correct answer is "no," and courts have used the rhetoric of
good faith to strike down such creditor enforcement decisions in
comparable marginal circumstances.2 °'
Likewise, consider Example Four, in which the Bank called
Randolph's loan to further implement its change in lending pol-
icy. It seems dubious to suggest that Randolph reasonably could
have anticipated that Local Bank would be acquired by a larger
financial institution like MegaBank; that MegaBank would
decide to no longer enter business relationships with small bor-
rowers; and that MegaBank would direct its officials to exercise
technical defaults to extract MegaBank from existing relation-
ships with small borrowers like Randolph. As such, the fact that
201. See, e.g., In re Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc., 87 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1988), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 97 B.R. 721 (D. Mass. 1989) (striking down
creditor enforcement decision where acceleration motivated by desire to force out
borrower's shareholder who had ties to organized crime); cf State Natl Bank v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 66, 685-861 (Tey. App. 1984) (striking down creditor enforcement
decision where threat of acceleration motivated by desire to prevent former CEO from
resuming control of the borrower's business operations). Helen Davis Chaitman, one of
the leading commentators in the lender liability field, articulated this as Commandment
IV in The Ten Commandments for Avoiding Lender Liability: "Thou Shalt Not Run Thy
Borrower's Business." Helen Davis Chaitman, The Ten Commandments for Avoiding
Lender Liability (Annotated) (7th ed. 1988), available in WESTLAW at 468 PLI/Comm
783, 818. These decisions and warning reflect an understanding that the lender will not
exercise default remedies in a fashion that constitutes an unwarranted interference with
the borrower's own business judgment-yet this understanding would be "unexpressed"
in the language of the typical mortgage or security agreement.
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Randolph did not anticipate such a change in Bank lending
policy-and thus did not bargain for an express constraint on
the Bank's authority to exercise its remedies under those cir-
cumstances-does not suggest that Randolph and the Bank
possess a shared understanding that Bank could call in
Randolph's credit line under those circumstances. °2 The court's
task in such a case is to ascertain what Randolph and the Bank
would have agreed to had they anticipated those circum-
stances. o3
Furthermore, it seems even more dubious to suggest that
Randolph reasonably could have anticipated the Bank's conduct
if the Bank had not exercised those same default remedies (i.e.,
acceleration based upon failure to provide financial statements)
on other commercial loans for which the prospect for repayment
remained secure. In other words, even if Randolph appreciated
the risk of this scenario, he reasonably could have expected the
Bank to treat his loan in a fashion consistent with the treatment
customarily extended to other Bank customers. In my view, a
decision to uphold the enforcement of the acceleration decision
in Example Four would be to "virtually 'read the doctrine of good
faith (or of implied contractual obligations and limitations) out
of existence' "20-4a view that one cannot reconcile with PEB
Commentary No. 10. I would thus characterize the Bank's deci-
sion to call in Randolph's line of credit in Example Four as bad
faith enforcement of its reserved rights.
I am less certain about the application of the "any-business-
reason" standard to Example Three, in which the Bank threat-
ens to call in Randolph's credit line unless he agrees to an in-
crease in interest rates. On the one hand, one can argue with
great force that the Garn Act's preemption of state restrictions
upon the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses2 5 has reshaped
reasonable commercial expectations of the parties to mortgage
202. Courts have recognized as much in comparable situations. See, e.g., First Nat'l
Bank v. Sylvester, 554 N.E.2d 1063, 1068-70 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (denying summary
judgment to lender that refused to extend credit to enable borrower to perform
profitable construction job; decision not in good faith if lender's decision was based upon
policy decision to no longer make construction loans).
203. See PEB ComIENTARY No. 10, supra note 90; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 91-93 (4th ed. 1992).
204. Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1268 (10th
Cir. 1988) (quoting Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
205. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
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transactions, such that now all reasonable parties understand
that the mortgagee may exercise objective default provisions to
protect itself against the economic risks posed by interest rate
fluctuations. Under that view, the Bank's decision to exercise its
remedies in Example Three would constitute a good faith en-
forcement of its default remedies. Were I the judge in Example
Three, I would conclude that the Bank acted in good faith and
uphold the Bank's decision on this basis.
On the other hand, it is not necessarily self-evident that all
commercial borrowers would equate the consequences of a due-
on-sale clause (which motivated the Garn Act) and a require-
ment to provide financial statements. Further, cases such as
Kendall.. and Schoolcraft°7 demonstrate the historical willing-
ness of courts to use the rhetoric of good faith to strike down
attempts to exercise contract rights for "unanticipated" or "op-
portunistic" economic advantage. If the future brings a return of
sharply rising interest rates, I expect that we will experience
another cycle of "due-on" litigation-and if past is prologue, the
rhetoric of good faith will produce judicial division over the ap-
propriateness of those acceleration decisions.
As a proponent of the "any-business-reason" standard of bad
faith, Professor Nelson doubtless would turn this uncertainty
against me. To the extent that mortgages law values certainty
and predictability, how can mortgages law subject the mort-
gagee to the risk of such ad hoc judicial
decisionmaking-especially when we know some courts (witness
AVEMCO and Cermack) will apply the duty of good faith to
reach incorrect decisions that accord insufficient respect to the
lender's business judgment? If we assume that interpretation of
the parties' agreement should be informed by efficiency con-
cerns,"8 I am sympathetic; but I am also unconvinced that a less
206. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985).
207. Schoolcraft v. Ross, 146 Cal. Rptr. 57 (Ct. App. 1978).
208. There are, of course, well-founded competing views on this point. See, e.g.,
DENNIs M. PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILrrY 155 (1989) ("Arguments over
meaning are not reducible to questions of Pareto optimality, wealth maximization or
efficiency. Interpretive arguments are dialogical contestations over the point of law. The
point of law is a function of questions about reasons (e.g., 'Why does this rule exist?';
'What is the purpose of this regulationT). The fallacy of economic models of
argumentation is the belief of their proponents that questions of meaning (and truth)
are susceptible of solution by resort to methodological means. Truth is not the product
of method. Truth is a socially-created artifact. Llewellyn understood this. His
understanding is in the Code. We should not ignore this truth.").
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absolute and more moderate "bad faith" standard will produce
greater inefficiency than the more absolute "any-business-rea-
son" standard. In fact, to some extent, the very certainty and
predictability of the "any-business-reason" standard is its most
significant shortcoming. While a less absolute bad faith stan-
dard introduces some measure of unpredictability, that unpre-
dictability does not have only negative effects.
At the margin, uncertainty can have positive effects by
meaningfully tempering creditor enforcement decisions. The
overwhelming majority of acceleration decisions are "no-
brainers" based upon serious monetary defaults, insolvent bor-
rowers, and/or obvious threats to the lender's security. In the
context of those decisions, the constraining effect that uncer-
tainty will have on creditor enforcement decisions is negligible
or nonexistent. For example, the risk of a challenge to the
Bank's decision to call in Randolph's line of credit in Example
One (where Randolph is insolvent) would not register on the
Bank's decisionmaking scale-or, even if it did register, it would
not change the Bank's decision. The prudence of the Bank's
decision, and the fact that the decision comports with the rea-
sonable expectations of each contracting party, is self-evident.
At the margin, however, the prudence of an acceleration
decision-or whether the decision comports with the likely ex-
pectations of the borrower-may not be self-evident. As in Ex-
ample Two, there may exist readily discoverable evidence that
the creditor's security is not impaired and its prospect of repay-
ment is not threatened. As in Example Four, the circumstances
under which the lender is exercising its reserved remedies may
be ones that could not have been reasonably anticipated by the
borrower at the time of the original loan agreement. As with any
collection effort, the creditor's decision to accelerate in these
marginal cases will impose significant consequences on the bor-
rower in terms of its ability to maintain operations both in the
short and long terms. In close cases-cases where a neutral
observer might choose not to accelerate based upon a lack of
security impairment, or because the borrower likely would not
have anticipated enforcement under the circumstances-a more
moderate conception of good faith will probably produce some
judicial mistakes (i.e., cases like AVEMCO in which the court
incorrectly ascertains the parties' reasonable expectations), but
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the uncertainty associated with those mistakes should also have
an in terrorem effect upon creditor decisionmaking.
In turn, this should have two beneficial effects. First, credi-
tors will respond at the level of documenting transactions, by
bargaining to obtain greater enforcement latitude in instances
where that latitude is necessary to protect their legitimate busi-
ness concerns." 9 To the extent that this reduces the likelihood
that legitimate expectations remain unexpressed, it should re-
duce the risk of courts imposing unwarranted costs by overex-
tending the duty of good faith. Second, creditors will respond at
the level of enforcing agreements by making more careful deci-
sions; the prudent creditor will exercise more careful judgment
in evaluating its secured position and will ensure that its en-
forcement decisions treat similarly situated borrowers in similar
fashion.21 On the margin, this circumspection should produce
better decisions. In this regard, a broader conception of good
faith-and the occasional damage award against the AVEMCOs
of the world-should serve to improve lender decisionmaking
about the monitoring and enforcement of loans to a greater ex-
tent than might be expected under a pure "freedom-of-contract"
or "any-business-reason"' view.
Which view is actually more efficient, of course, is an empiri-
cal question for which there is no clear answer. Until we have
209. For example, consider what transpired following the decision in Kendall v.
Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985), discussed supra in notes 139-41 and
accompanying text. The lease in Kendall was silent as to the question of whether the
landlord could withhold consent to an assignment or sublease in order to capture lease
bonus value. As a result, the court concluded that the tenant would not have reasonably
expected the landlord to withhold consent in order to renegotiate the stated rent or to
capture the bonus value inherent in the lease. Following Kendall, landlords inserted
clauses into their leases specifically authorizing the landlord to withhold consent unless
the tenant agreed to pay some or all of the increased rental value of the premises to
the landlord. Courts upheld those provisions in the face of challenges by tenants, as
they should have--clearly, no tenant signing such a lease could legitimately claim
unfair surprise or disappointed expectations if the landlord used the provision as a
means to recapture bonus value. See Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev.
Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 727-29 (Cal. 1992) (stating that a landlord did not breach duty
of good faith and fair dealing in enforcing specific, bargained-for provision allocating
lease bonus value).
210. Indeed, this is precisely how the lending industry responded to the "lender
liability boomlet," as reflected by the proliferation of books, manuals, and presentations
designed to help lenders plan for avoiding lender liability claims. See, e.g., GERALD L.
BLANCHARD, LENDER LIABILITY: LAW, PRACTICE AND PREVENTION (1989); MARK E.
BUDNITZ, THE LAW OF LENDER LIABILITY (rev. ed. 1994); PETER M. EDELSTEIN, THE
LENDER LIABILITY DESKBOOK (1992).
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that clear answer, we can expect the debate over the proper
application of the duty of good faith to continue-and we can
expect less certainty and predictability than section 8.1 may
have hoped for.
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